Ramsey test
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The Ramsey test (also called the Ramsey test for conditionals) is a proposal for how to evaluate and accept conditional sentences of the form if p (then) q. Informally, the guiding idea is that, to decide whether to accept a conditional if-p-then-q in a given belief state K, one must hypothetically add p to K and revise K in a minimal and rational way to accommodate p; then, one must accept if-p-then-q if, and only if, q would be accepted in the resulting belief state.
Evidence and sources
In contemporary formulations, the "minimal" change of belief is made precise by a belief revision operation or by a rule for changing probabilities or possible-world rankings, depending on the framework. The test originates in a brief footnote in Frank P. Ramsey's 1929 essay General Propositions and Causality, but has since been developed in several overlapping research traditions, namely, in the theory of , in , in , and in dynamic and non-monotonic logics.
The Ramsey test has also been shown to generate various "triviality" results when combined with seemingly natural constraints on rational belief change, leading to an extensive literature on how it should be formulated and where its limits lie.
The Ramsey test (also called the Ramsey test for conditionals) is a proposal for how to evaluate and accept conditional sentences of the form if p (then) q. Informally, the guiding idea is that, to decide whether to accept a conditional if-p-then-q in a given belief state K, one must hypothetically add p to K and revise K in a minimal and rational way to accommodate p; then, one must accept if-p-then-q if, and only if, q would be accepted in the resulting belief state.
In contemporary formulations, the "minimal" change of belief is made precise by a belief revision operation or by a rule for changing probabilities or possible-world rankings, depending on the framework. The test originates in a brief footnote in Frank P. Ramsey's 1929 essay General Propositions and Causality, but has since been developed in several overlapping research traditions, namely, in the theory of , in , in , and in dynamic and non-monotonic logics.
The Ramsey test has also been shown to generate various "triviality" results when combined with seemingly natural constraints on rational belief change, leading to an extensive literature on how it should be formulated and where its limits lie. An influential proposal, called "the Ramsey–Adams thesis" or "Adams's thesis", holds that, for suitable indicative conditionals, the acceptability or assertability of if p, q is governed by the conditional probability P(q \mid p) .
Some proposals, such as Robert Stalnaker's, go further and identify the probability of the conditional with the corresponding conditional probability, e.g. P(\text{if }p,q)=P(q\mid p) . However, in 1976, philosopher David Lewis proved a famous series of triviality results which show that, under plausible assumptions, such equations cannot hold generally for non-trivial probability functions, motivating weaker connections between conditional probability and conditional acceptability.
A related line of work studies how probabilities for compounds and embeddings of conditionals can be assigned while avoiding triviality, for example by restricting the language or weakening closure assumptions.
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