Red Guards

The Red Guards ( ) were a mass, student-led, paramilitary social movement mobilized by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966¹ until their abolition in 1968, during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, which he had instituted. According to a Red Guard leader, the movement's aims were as follows: Despite meeting with resistance early on, the Red Guards received personal support from Mao, and the movement rapidly grew. The movement in Beijing culminated during the Red August of 1966, which later spread to other areas in mainland China. Mao made use of the group as propaganda and to accomplish goals such as seizing power and destroying symbols of China's pre-communist past, including ancient artifacts and gravesites of notable Chinese figures. Moreover, the government was very permissive of the Red Guards, and even allowed the Red Guards to inflict bodily harm on people viewed as dissidents. The movement quickly grew out of control. Factions within the Red Guards frequently criticized one another showing that divisions amongst each other was a defining feature of the movement's development. The Red Guard had frequently come into conflict with authority and threatening public security until the government made efforts to rein the youths in, with even Mao himself finding the leftist students to have become too radical.…

The Red Guards ( ) were a mass, student-led, paramilitary social movement mobilized by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966 until their abolition in 1968, during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, which he had instituted. According to a Red Guard leader, the movement's aims were as follows: Despite meeting with resistance early on, the Red Guards received personal support from Mao, and the movement rapidly grew. The movement in Beijing culminated during the Red August of 1966, which later spread to other areas in mainland China. Mao made use of the group as propaganda and to accomplish goals such as seizing power and destroying symbols of China's pre-communist past, including ancient artifacts and gravesites of notable Chinese figures. Moreover, the government was very permissive of the Red Guards, and even allowed the Red Guards to inflict bodily harm on people viewed as dissidents. The movement quickly grew out of control. Factions within the Red Guards frequently criticized one another showing that divisions amongst each other was a defining feature of the movement's development. The Red Guard had frequently come into conflict with authority and threatening public security until the government made efforts to rein the youths in, with even Mao himself finding the leftist students to have become too radical. By the end of 1968, the group as a formal movement had dissolved with many of the red guards sent to rural areas and country side due to the Down to the Countryside Movement.

Origins

, Shanghai, China says "Defend Central Committee with (our) blood and life! Defend Chairman Mao with (our) blood and life!"]] The first students to call themselves "Red Guards" in China were from the Tsinghua University High School. The students used the name to sign two big-character posters issued on 25 May – 2 June 1966. The students believed that the criticism of the play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office was a political issue and needed greater attention. The group of students – led by Zhang Chengzhi at Tsinghua Middle School and Nie Yuanzi at Peking University – originally wrote the posters as a constructive criticism of Tsinghua University and Peking University's administrations, who were accused of harbouring intellectual elitism and bourgeois tendencies. Most of the early Red Guards came from the Five Red Categories. The Red Guards were denounced as counter-revolutionaries and radicals by the school administration and by fellow students and were forced to secretly meet amongst the ruins of the Old Summer Palace. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao Zedong ordered that the manifesto of the Red Guards be broadcast on national radio and published in the People's Daily newspaper. This action gave the Red Guards political legitimacy, and student groups quickly began to appear across China. By the end of August 1966, almost every Chinese city and a majority of counties had Red Guard activity. Eighty-five percent of counties had local Red Guard activity by October 1966. According to sociologist Andrew G. Walder, "These figures represent a remarkable level of popular political mobilization. At no point in the previous history of the regime were ordinary citizens permitted, much less encouraged, to form independent political organizations." Due to the factionalism already emerging in the Red Guard movement, President Liu Shaoqi made the decision in early June 1966 to send in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) work teams. These workgroups were led by Zhang Chunqiao, head of China's Propaganda Department, in an attempt by the Party to keep the movement under control. Rival Red Guard groups led by the sons and daughters of cadres were formed by these work teams to deflect attacks from those in positions of power towards bourgeois elements in society, mainly intellectuals. In addition, these Party-backed rebel groups also attacked students with 'bad' class backgrounds, including children of former landlords and capitalists. These actions were all attempts by the CCP to preserve the existing state government and apparatus. Mao, concerned that these work teams were hindering the course of the Cultural Revolution, dispatched Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and others to join the Red Guards and combat the work teams. In July 1966, Mao ordered the removal of the remaining work teams (against the wishes of Liu Shaoqi) and condemned their 'Fifty Days of White Terror', a label referencing the period of time the work teams were active. The Red Guards were then free to organize without the restrictions of the Party and, within a few weeks, on the encouragement of Mao's supporters, Red Guard groups had appeared in almost every school in China. Mao had multiple reasons for supporting the Red Guards' activities, the primary one being his wish to undermine Liu Shaoqi, with whom he grew increasingly distrustful. Furthermore, Mao intended to make the revolutionary ideals more ingrained in the Chinese youth, as a way to harden their spirit and combat traditional scholarly education. Chiang Kai-Shek believed Mao lost trust in CCP officials and members, Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) members, and even workers, peasants and soldiers, so he had put faith in the students, and made use of the Red Guards to preserve his authority, Chiang also believed Mao started the massive purge among knowledgeable and contributive CCP officials and members and CYLC members in the name of Maoism, let Red Guards replace them to inherit the party.

Red Guard Factionalism and Infighting

Factionalism was a defining feature of the Red Guard movement. From the movement's inception in 1966 to its decline and suppression in 1968, organized student groups split into factions that fought for control of schools, workplaces, and local governments. Factional divisions within the Red Guards frequently produced two opposing groups, often described as "radical" and "conservative" camps. For instance, in Beijing, the Red Guards split into the more conservative "Heaven" faction and the radical "Earth" faction, while the Guangdong Red Guards split into the conservative "Red Flag" and radical "East Wind" factions. Despite factions being labelled "radical" and "conservative", ideological differences between factions were slight. Both the conservative and radical factions were loyal to Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. Factions framed their efforts as defending the Cultural Revolution against leaders they accused of betraying the cause. Opposing factions often shared similar political orientation and leadership structures, but disagreed on personalities and political tactics. Being conservative on one issue did not mean that an individual held a conservative position on another, and alliances frequently crossed factional lines. In Zhejiang province, the conservative faction "Red Storm" and the rival radical faction "United Headquarters" shared a commitment to the Cultural Revolution but fought over leadership. The United Headquarters rallied against Jiang Hua, the First Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee, since they found him overtly capitalist. The Red Storm quelled the rally after learning that Mao planned to protect Jiang, which caused a rift between the factions. Over a period of two years, the conflict escalated between rival groups and led to instability in the province for most of the following decade. In Wuhan, factionalism occurred in a more fragmented form. There were several radical factions, including the "Workers' Headquarters," "Second Headquarters," "17 August Corps," "Fragrant Flower Faction," and "Poisonous Weed Faction," as well as several conservative factions such as the "Million Heroes" and the pro-army factions, which rose and collapsed over the course of the Red Guard movement. In 1967, the conservative faction "Red Armed Guards" formed a major organization with 240,000 members¹, becoming one of Wuhan's largest factions. The radical factions responded by banding together into a united front to confront the powerful conservative force. The alliance proved unstable and soon deteriorated into open conflict, with rival factions fighting for control of the city, further contributing to disorder. As the Red Guard movement became more fragmented, divisions contributed to Wuhan's factional conflict. The emergence of Red Guard factionalism has been linked to the intervention and subsequent withdrawal of CCP work teams in 1966. Work teams disrupted existing authority structures within schools and divided students based on their responses to them, producing lasting antagonisms among their members and followers. After the work teams were abruptly withdrawn in July 1966, students¹ who had cooperated with them organized into conservative factions, while others formed rival radical groups. By late 1967, conflicts within the Red Guards had escalated dramatically as each faction competed for influence and power. The violence intensified between factions as political and social consequences became more salient, and the state failed to mediate effectively. Conflicts expanded into large-scale clashes across cities and campuses as the Red Guards fought to retain power.

Suppression by the PLA (1967–1968)

By February 1967, political opinion at the center had decided on the removal of the Red Guards from the Cultural Revolution scene in the interest of stability. The PLA forcibly suppressed the more radical Red Guard groups in Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Fujian, and Hubei provinces in February and March. Students were ordered to return to schools; student radicalism was branded 'counterrevolutionary' and banned. These groups, as well as many of their supporters, were later branded May Sixteenth elements after an ultra-left Red Guard organization based in Beijing. May Sixteenth elements (五一六分子) were named after the so-called May Sixteenth Army Corps (五一六兵团; 1967–1968), ultra-left Red Guards in Beijing during the early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) who targeted Zhou Enlai with the backing of Jiang Qing. The name came from the historic May 16 Notice (五一六通知) which Mao Zedong partially wrote and edited, which triggered the revolution. However, Mao was concerned with its radicalism, so in late 1967 the group was outlawed on conspiracy and anarchism charges, followed by the arrest of many Cultural Revolution Group members (except Jiang Qing and other core members). Mao became increasingly frustrated with the Red Guards' perceived inability to cooperate, which was the ongoing cause of constant violence. This eventually led to chairman's decision to call on the PLA to reestablish order. A nationwide campaign was later launched to liquidate "May Sixteenth Elements", which created further chaos. There was a wide backlash in the spring against the suppression, with student attacks on any symbol of authority and PLA units, but not on Marshal Lin Biao, the Minister of National Defense and one of the chairman's biggest allies. An order from Mao, the Cultural Revolution Group, the State Council, and the Central Military Affairs Committee of the PLA on 5 September 1967 instructed the PLA to restore order to China and end the chaos. The order came within months of incidents of PLA forces disobeying government and CRG orders during the summer (the most extreme case being the Wuhan incident, where the Wuhan Military Region under Chen Zaidao went further than cracking down on Red Guards to arrest the Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi), the aftermath of these resulted in even more violence amongst the Red Guards, even targeting local level PLA formations, raising fears of a repeat of the Wuhan events and other similar ones. The PLA violently put down the national Red Guard movement in the year that followed, with the suppression often brutal. A radical alliance of Red Guard groups in Hunan province, called the Shengwulian, was involved in clashes with local PLA units, for example, and in the first half of 1968 was forcibly suppressed. At the same time, the PLA carried out mass executions of Red Guards in Guangxi province that were unprecedented in the Cultural Revolution. The final remnants of the movement were defeated in Beijing in the summer of 1968. Allegedly, Mao had an audience with the Red Guard leaders, during which the chairman informed them of himself being directly responsible for the orders to suppress them, in favor of the military's administration. After the summer of 1968, some more radical students continued to travel across China and play an unofficial part in the Cultural Revolution, but by then the movement's official and substantial role was over.

Scholarly interpretations

Several scholars have proposed explanations for Red Guard factionalism, debating whether divisions emerged from students' social backgrounds or from political processes during the Cultural Revolution. One early interpretation by political scientist Hong Yung Lee (1975) argues that the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution produced conservative and radical factional divisions that reflected conflicts between elite and mass participants. Competing political actors encouraged alliances among different student groups, creating factional divisions that cut across organizational and institutional boundaries. This interpretation primarily used publicly available materials, such as Red Guard publications, newspapers, monographs, and handbills. Another line of scholarship emphasizes the role of family background and social class in creating factional divisions. In a 1980 article, historian Anita Chan, political scientist Stanley Rosen, and sociologist Jonathan Unger argue that antagonisms among students shaped factional membership, strategies, and interests. Their analysis drew from interviews with former Chinese students who emigrated to Hong Kong, local surveys, and Red Guard publications. It is also suggested that students' family origins played a more significant role in creating factional divisions than ideological disagreements during the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, Rosen emphasized the importance of pre-existing social divisions in schools. Evidence from local surveys, factional and CCP publications, and interviews with former Chinese students living in Hong Kong is presented to show how tensions between class and family backgrounds shaped factional outcomes once the Cultural Revolution began. Rosen argues that students from "middle" or "bad" class backgrounds were more likely to join radical factions, whereas conservative factions were mostly composed of students from military families or revolutionary cadres. Later scholarship has drawn on more primary accounts that have challenged these class-based explanations. Political sociologist Andrew G. Walder (2002) argues that personal interests and grievances, rather than social backgrounds, played the primary role in producing factions. A study of the Beijing Red Guards reconstructed the event sequences to show that the relationship between student background and factional affiliation became significant only after factions had already formed in late 1966, suggesting that social differences were reinforced by factional politics rather than causing them. Factional allegiances have been indicated as being determined by students' political choices to pursue individual interests. Walder argues that conservative factions formed around students who were aligned with and benefited from state institutions, while radical factions attracted those who were politically marginalized. In his later research, Walder (2019) further argued that factional alignments were shaped by shifting interactions among rival student groups, local authorities, and military organizations. Other scholarship has highlighted the importance of student agency in the development of Red Guard factionalism. Historian Xiaowei Zheng (2006) argues that students actively interpreted and responded to changing political circumstances during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Zheng uses interviews with former Red Guard leaders and activists, along with a case study of Tsinghua University, to argue that factional divisions formed in response to students' political choices and were informed by their beliefs and experiences rather than class background. In this perspective, Red Guard factionalism was shaped by ideological commitment and students' efforts to define revolutionary legitimacy in an evolving political environment.

Rustication

From 1962 to 1979, 16 to 18 million youths were sent to the countryside to undergo re-education. Sending city students to the countryside was also used to defuse the student fanaticism set in motion by the Red Guards. On 22 December 1968, Chairman Mao directed the People's Daily to publish a piece entitled "We too have two hands, let us not laze about in the city", which quoted Mao as saying "The intellectual youth must go to the country, and be educated from living in rural poverty." In 1969 many youths were rusticated.

See also

Little Red Guards Red August Violent struggle Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution) Gang of Four Morning Sun (film) Socialist Patriotic Youth League Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung Little Pink, Red ribbon

References

Further reading

Chan, A; 'Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation'; University of Washington Press (1985) Chesneaux, J; 'China: The People's Republic Since 1949'; Harvester Press (1979) Howard, R; "Red Guards are always right". New Society, 2 February 1967, pp. 169–170. Karnow, S; 'Mao and China: Inside China's Cultural Revolution'; Penguin (1984) Meisner, M; 'Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic Since 1949'; Free Press (1986) Teiwes, F; "Mao and His Followers". A Critical Introduction to Mao Zedong; Cambridge University Press (2010) Van der Sprenkel, S; The Red Guards in perspective. New Society, 22 September 1966, pp. 455–456. Walder, A; 'Fractured Rebellion: the Beijing Red Guard Movement'; Harvard University Press (2009)

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378106595 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.