Regulatory taking
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In United States constitutional law, a regulatory taking refers to a situation in which governmental regulations restrict the use of private property to an extent that the landowner is substantially deprived of the reasonable use or value of their property. This principle is grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stipulates that governments are obligated to provide just compensation for such takings.
This amendment is applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby ensuring that property rights are protected at both federal and state levels.
In United States constitutional law, a regulatory taking refers to a situation in which governmental regulations restrict the use of private property to an extent that the landowner is substantially deprived of the reasonable use or value of their property. This principle is grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stipulates that governments are obligated to provide just compensation for such takings.
This amendment is applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby ensuring that property rights are protected at both federal and state levels.
Legal tender cases
An early case involving interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870) During the American Civil War, the Legal Tender Acts of 1862 and 1863 made paper money a legal substitute for gold and silver, including for the payment of preexisting debts. In Hepburn v. Griswold, the Supreme Court had found the legal tender laws inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, which prohibited the states from passing "any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts."
Moreover, the Court had held that an act compelling holders of contracts that called for payment in gold or silver to accept as legal tender "mere promises to pay dollars" was unconstitutional because it deprived "such persons of property without due process of law" under the Fifth Amendment. The Court until this time had rarely found an act of Congress unconstitutional.
In 1871, the Court, with two new justices on the bench, reversed itself in the legal tender cases, Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, and declared the Legal Tender Acts constitutional. The Fifth Amendment does not apply to injuries which flow from the exercise of lawful power, the court held, but only to direct appropriation of property.
The fifth amendment. ... forbids taking private property for public use without just compensation or due process of law. That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.
It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts.
But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be charged, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?
Application of the 14th Amendment to the States
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extended the protection against uncompensated takings to citizens against their own states. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Prior to the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). But in the aftermath of the Civil War, the United States adopted the 14th Amendment, which guaranteed equal protection, the privileges or immunities of citizens, and due process of law to all while the 14th Amendment did not explicitly state that the states could not infringe upon the rights of people guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court began incorporating those rights, finding they applied to the states through the 14th Amendment.
The first instance of a right in the bill of rights to be incorporated into the 14th Amendment and applied to a state was for a taking of property in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has historically been a major vehicle for the increased federal judicial review of the constitutionality of state activity.
We find early justices of the Supreme Court puzzling over this, for example, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887): It is not a little remarkable that, while this provision has been in the constitution of the United States as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government for nearly a century, and while during all that time the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theater of public discussion. But while it has been a part of the constitution as a restraint upon the powers of the states only a very few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of the provision as found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem from the character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.
Health and safety takings
Suppose the government must cut a firebreak through a forest upon private property to prevent spread of a forest fire. Or suppose the government destroys healthy livestock in a quarantine area to prevent spread of disease. These are invasive takings, but they do not fall under the per se rule described in a previous section.
From the very first, the takings cases recognized that `all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.' Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
The most straightforward example of this principle occurs when the government must condemn or destroy property to prevent spread of disease or other threat to the public health or safety: Thus, in order to protect the health and safety of the community, government may condemn unsafe structures, may close unlawful business operations, may destroy infected trees, and surely may restrict access to hazardous areas – for example, land on which radioactive materials have been discharged, land in the path of a lava flow from an erupting volcano, or land in the path of a potentially life-threatening flood. When a governmental entity imposes these types of health and safety regulations, it may not be 'burdened with the condition that [it] must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.
The mere invocation of health and safety concerns to justify a regulation does not automatically shield it from takings liability. As Justice Scalia explained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, "Since such a [harm-prevention] justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.
We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations."
Andrus v. Allard
In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court found that the federal Eagle Protection Act could prohibit the sale of lawfully purchased eagle parts. The Court noted that the Act did not confiscate the owner's property, but rather regulated the terms of sale: The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them.
Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.
[citations omitted]. In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds. The fact that the statute barred the most profitable use of the property was not sufficient, the Court held: It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees' property.
Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking. Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 594, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra.
In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future profits – unaccompanied by any physical property restriction – provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim.
Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests. Cf., e. g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt.
1), 46 Yale L. J. 52 (1936).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a regulation is generally considered a per se taking when it forces landowners to endure a permanent physical occupation on their land, such as the permanent physical presence of cable lines on a residential building. The Court held that any permanent physical presence destroyed the property owner's right to exclude, long recognized as one of the key rights in the "bundle of rights" commonly characterized as property.
The Court considered a New York statute which required landlords to install CATV cable facilities on the roof of their buildings; the facilities were part of a citywide cable network designed to bring cable services to the entire city. The landlords were required to provide a location for of cable one-half inch in diameter and two metal boxes at a one-time charge determined by the Cable Commission at $1 ( ).
The City argued that the Court should apply a balancing test—that the invasion of property was minimal in comparison to the community wide benefit. But the Court's decision suggested that there was a per se rule requiring compensation in cases of this kind.
In short, when the "character of the governmental action, is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." The dissent in Loretto pointed out that there are circumstances wherein the government may require installation of devices without compensation: "...the States traditionally – and constitutionally – have exercised their police power "to require landlords to ... provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building."
These provisions merely ensure tenants access to services the legislature deems important, such as water, electricity, natural light, telephones, inter-communication systems, and mail service. The majority opinion distinguished such requirements because they "do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party."
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
In 1985, the Supreme Court applied its regulatory takings analysis to the Clean Water Act, which prohibits any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters"—defined as the "waters of the United States"—unless authorized by a permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121.
The Corps issued regulations construing the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that are adjacent to other covered waters. These regulations defined the adjacent wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., began placing fill materials on its property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan. A Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Corps' interpretation, and suggested that the regulation would create a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that in order to be within the regulatory authority of the United States, these semi-aquatic characteristics would have to be the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters. But the Supreme Court rejected the attempt to narrow the Corps of Engineer's regulatory reach.
Perhaps some particular properties might in individual cases be so adversely impacted that a taking might be found. But this would not justify overturning the regulation itself. "Governmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a 'taking' of the affected property.
See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).
But mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner.
"[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) This maxim rests on the principle that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a State regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of that property can be a taking. Lucas had purchased two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on the immediately adjacent parcels.
At that time, Lucas's lots were not subject to the State's coastal zone building permit requirements. In 1988, however, the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his parcels.
He filed suit against respondent state agency, contending that, even though the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "economically viable use" of his property and therefore effected a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required the payment of just compensation. The court further clarified, however, that a regulation is not a taking if it is consistent with "restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already placed upon ownership."
As an example of "background principles," the court referred to the right of government to prevent flooding of others' property. The Court noted: A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the "harmful or noxious use" principle was merely this Court's early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; that the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; and that, therefore, noxious-use logic cannot be the basis for departing from this Court's categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. ...
Although it seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land, this state-law question must be dealt with on remand. To win its case, respondent cannot simply proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, but must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Lucas now intends in the property's present circumstances.
Lucas was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court which in turn remanded it to the trial court for a valuation trial. However, the case settled when the state bought Lucas' property and later resold it to a developer.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
On June 28, 2001, the Court issued its opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Palazzolo addressed two issues: When is a takings claim ripe? When does notice of a preexisting regulation destroy the right to challenge the application of that regulation?
For forty years, the plaintiff's corporation owned a valuable parcel of property in the town of Westerly, Rhode Island. The property consisted of roughly eighteen acres of wetlands and a small indeterminate amount of uplands. The land was divided into seventy-four parcels in two subdivision map filings that occurred in 1936 and 1959.
Like the neighboring homes, the only way to develop Mr. Palazzolo's land is to raise the grade with fill. In 1971, the Rhode Island Legislature authorized the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate the filling of coastal wetlands.
The CRMC promulgated regulations requiring that any filling of coastal salt marsh, such as that found on the plaintiff's property, meet certain public interest requirements. CRMC had ruled that private housing does not meet this public interest requirement.
Prior to the adoption of this regulatory regime, the plaintiff applied twice to utilize the property but each time the State withdrew its approval, and the plaintiff did not appeal. As a preliminary issue the Supreme Court addressed the question whether Palazzolo's case was "ripe" for review by the Courts.
The central question, the Court found, was whether the plaintiff had obtained a final decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land. A number of previous cases had established "the important principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation: A final decision does not occur until the responsible agency determines the extent of permitted development on the land.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351. On the question of whether the plaintiff could proceed with a taking claim after he acquired the property in his personal capacity from his corporation after the regulations were already in place, the Court held that he could.
As Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority said: Were the Court to accept that rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.
Inverse condemnation
Inverse condemnation is a term which describes a claim brought against the government in which a property owner seeks compensation for a `taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment. In states that prohibit uncompensated taking or damaging, physical damage to property is included in this definition.
The term "inverse" is used, because usually condemnations are brought by the government. In the inverse condemnation context, it is the property owner who sues the government, alleging a taking (or damaging) of property without just compensation.
Permit exhaustion
One precondition of a regulatory takings claim is that the claimant must obtain a final decision by the regulating entity as to what uses will be permitted. The Supreme Court's decisions make it clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 293–297(1981): In Palazzolo, the Court held that the case was ripe because Palazzolo had applied for multiple permits and it was clear what could or could not be done with the property.
The denominator problem
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court ruled that takings law does not divide property into discrete segments. Thus, the property interest in question during a taking case is the whole parcel of land and not a discrete sliver of it.
This gave rise to the question of what is the "denominator" of the ownership fraction; i.e., what is the larger ownership whose part is being subjected to confiscatory regulation, since the regulatory taking of a part of it (the "numerator") is not compensable. In Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.
1933 (2017), the Court held that denominator is best assessed through a multi-factor balancing test that includes such factors as "the treatment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law," the "physical characteristics of the landowner’s property," and "the value of the property under the challenged regulation." The policy underlying the whole parcel rule is that it is "essential to an interpretation of the takings clause that leaves any room for public planning and regulation of land uses."
External links
Property (Casebook) ( ). Reason magazine article from 1995, concerning political strategies for passing takings initiatives
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1355998419 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.