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  "slug": "safety-engineering",
  "title": "Safety engineering",
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  "lead": "Safety engineering is an engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to industrial engineering/systems engineering, and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail.",
  "body": "Safety engineering is an engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to industrial engineering/systems engineering, and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail. ==Analysis techniques== Analysis techniques can be split into two categories: qualitative and quantitative methods. Both approaches share the goal of finding causal dependencies between a hazard on system level and failures of individual components. Qualitative approaches focus on the question \"What must go wrong, such that a system hazard may occur?\", while quantitative methods aim at providing estimations about probabilities, rates and/or severity of consequences. The complexity of the technical systems such as Improvements of Design and Materials, Planned Inspections, Fool-proof design, and Backup Redundancy decreases risk and increases the cost. The risk can be decreased to ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) or ALAPA (as low as practically achievable) levels. Traditionally, safety analysis techniques rely solely on skill and expertise of the safety engineer. In the last decade model-based approaches, like STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis), have become prominent. In contrast to traditional methods, model-based techniques try to derive relationships between causes and consequences from some sort of model of the system. ===Traditional methods for safety analysis=== The two most common fault modeling techniques are called failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). These techniques are just ways of finding problems and of making plans to cope with failures, as in probabilistic risk assessment. One of the earliest complete studies using this technique on a commercial nuclear plant was the WASH-1400 study, also known as the Reactor Safety Study or the Rasmussen Report. ====Failure modes and effects analysis==== Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a bottom-up, inductive analytical method which may be performed at either the functional or piece-part level. For functional FMEA, failure modes are identified for each function in a system or equipment item, usually with the help of a functional block diagram. For piece-part FMEA, failure modes are identified for each piece-part component (such as a valve, connector, resistor, or diode). The effects of the failure mode are described, and assigned a probability based on the failure rate and failure mode ratio of the function or component. This quantization is difficult for software ---a bug exists or not, and the failure models used for hardware components do not apply. Temperature and age and manufacturing variability affect a resistor; they do not affect software. Failure modes with identical effects can be combined and summarized in a Failure Mode Effects Summary. When combined with criticality analysis, FMEA is known as Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis or FMECA. ====Fault tree analysis==== Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive analytical method. In FTA, initiating primary events such as component failures, human errors, and external events are traced through Boolean logic gates to an undesired top event such as an aircraft crash or nuclear reactor core melt. The intent is to identify ways to make top events less probable, and verify that safety goals have been achieved. Fault trees are a logical inverse of success trees, and may be obtained by applying de Morgan's theorem to success trees (which are directly related to reliability block diagrams). FTA may be qualitative or quantitative. When failure and event probabilities are unknown, qualitative fault trees may be analyzed for minimal cut sets. For example, if any minimal cut set contains a single base event, then the top event may be caused by a single failure. Quantitative FTA is used to compute top event probability, and usually requires computer software such as CAFTA from the Electric Power Research Institute or SAPHIRE from the Idaho National Laboratory. Some industries use both fault trees and event trees. An event tree starts from an undesired initiator (loss of critical supply, component failure etc.) and follows possible further system events through to a series of final consequences. As each new event is considered, a new node on the tree is added with a split of probabilities of taking either branch. The probabilities of a range of \"top events\" arising from the initial event can then be seen. ==Safety certification== Typically, safety guidelines prescribe a set of steps, deliverable documents, and exit criterion focused around planning, analysis and design, implementation, verification and validation, configuration management, and quality assurance activities for the development of a safety-critical system. In addition, they typically formulate expectations regarding the creation and use of traceability in the project. For example, depending upon the criticality level of a requirement, the US Federal Aviation Administration guideline DO-178B/C requires traceability from requirements to design, and from requirements to source code and executable object code for software components of a system. Thereby, higher quality traceability information can simplify the certification process and help to establish trust in the maturity of the applied development process. Usually a failure in safety-certified systems is acceptable if, on average, less than one life per 10 9 hours of continuous operation is lost to failure.{as per FAA document AC 25.1309-1A} Most Western nuclear reactors, medical equipment, and commercial aircraft are certified to this level. The cost versus loss of lives has been considered appropriate at this level (by FAA for aircraft systems under Federal Aviation Regulations). ==Preventing failure== graph shows the relationship between the survival of a crew of astronauts and the amount of redundant equipment in their spacecraft (the \"MM\", Mission Module). Once a failure mode is identified, it can usually be mitigated by adding extra or redundant equipment to the system. For example, nuclear reactors contain dangerous radiation, and nuclear reactions can cause so much heat that no substance might contain them. Therefore, reactors have emergency core cooling systems to keep the temperature down, shielding to contain the radiation, and engineered barriers (usually several, nested, surmounted by a containment building) to prevent accidental leakage. Safety-critical systems are commonly required to permit no single event or component failure to result in a catastrophic failure mode. Most biological organisms have a certain amount of redundancy: multiple organs, multiple limbs, etc. For any given failure, a fail-over or redundancy can almost always be designed and incorporated into a system. There are two categories of techniques to reduce the probability of failure: Fault avoidance techniques increase the reliability of individual items (increased design margin, de-rating, etc.). Fault tolerance techniques increase the reliability of the system as a whole (redundancies, barriers, etc.). ==See also== Functional safety Fail-safe ===Associations=== International System Safety Society ==References== ===Notes=== ===Sources===",
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