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  "slug": "scientific-method",
  "title": "Scientific method",
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  "lead": "The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge through careful observation, rigorous skepticism, hypothesis testing, and experimental validation. Developed from ancient and medieval practices, it acknowledges that cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation. The scientific method has characterized science since at least the 17th century. Scientific inquiry includes creating a testable hypothesis through inductive reasoning, testing it through experiments and statistical analysis, and adjusting or discarding the hypothesis based on the results. Although procedures vary across fields, the underlying process is often similar. In more detail: the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypothetical explanations), predicting the logical consequences of hypothesis, then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions. A hypothesis is a conjecture based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the question. Hypotheses can be very specific or broad but must be falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested.…",
  "body": "The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge through careful observation, rigorous skepticism, hypothesis testing, and experimental validation. Developed from ancient and medieval practices, it acknowledges that cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation. The scientific method has characterized science since at least the 17th century. Scientific inquiry includes creating a testable hypothesis through inductive reasoning, testing it through experiments and statistical analysis, and adjusting or discarding the hypothesis based on the results. Although procedures vary across fields, the underlying process is often similar. In more detail: the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypothetical explanations), predicting the logical consequences of hypothesis, then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions. A hypothesis is a conjecture based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the question. Hypotheses can be very specific or broad but must be falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested. While the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it actually represents a set of general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order. Numerous discoveries have not followed the textbook model of the scientific method, and, in some cases, chance has played a role. == Elements of inquiry== There are different ways of outlining the basic method used for scientific inquiry. The scientific community and philosophers of science generally agree on the following classification of method components. These methodological elements and organization of procedures tend to be more characteristic of experimental sciences than social sciences. Nonetheless, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses, will resemble the cycle described below. The scientific method is an iterative, cyclical process through which information is continually revised. It is generally recognized to develop advances in knowledge through the following elements, in varying combinations or contributions: === Science is a social enterprise, and scientific work tends to be accepted by the scientific community when it has been confirmed. Crucially, experimental and theoretical results must be reproduced by others within the scientific community. Researchers have given their lives for this vision; Georg Wilhelm Richmann was killed by ball lightning (1753) when attempting to replicate the 1752 kite-flying experiment of Benjamin Franklin. If an experiment cannot be repeated to produce the same results, this implies that the original results might have been in error. As a result, it is common for a single experiment to be performed multiple times, especially when there are uncontrolled variables or other indications of experimental error. For significant or surprising results, other scientists may also attempt to replicate the results for themselves, especially if those results would be important to their own work. Replication has become a contentious issue in social and biomedical science where treatments are administered to groups of individuals. Typically an experimental group gets the treatment, such as a drug, and the control group gets a placebo. John Ioannidis in 2005 pointed out that the method being used has led to many findings that cannot be replicated. Peer review—anonymous expert evaluation of research—assesses experimental soundness rather than certifying correctness. Some journals request that the experimenter provide lists of possible peer reviewers, especially if the field is highly specialized. Specialists review methodology and design; if approved (sometimes requiring additional experiments), the prestige of the journal where the work is published indicates perceived quality. Scientists typically are careful in recording their data, a requirement promoted by Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961) and others. Though not typically required, they might be requested to supply this data to other scientists who wish to replicate their original results (or parts of their original results), extending to the sharing of any experimental samples that may be difficult to obtain. To protect against bad science and fraudulent data, government research-granting agencies such as the National Science Foundation, and science journals, including Nature and Science, have a policy that researchers must archive their data and methods so that other researchers can test the data and methods and build on the research that has gone before. Scientific data archiving can be done at several national archives in the U.S. or the World Data Center. ==Rationality== The following section will first explore beliefs and biases, and then get to the rational reasoning most associated with the sciences. ===Beliefs and biases=== Scientific methodology often directs that hypotheses be tested in controlled conditions wherever possible. This is frequently possible in certain areas, such as in the biological sciences, and more difficult in other areas, such as in astronomy. The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have the effect of diminishing the potentially harmful effects of circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, pre-existing beliefs can alter the interpretation of results, as in confirmation bias; this is a heuristic that leads a person with a particular belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if another observer might disagree (in other words, people tend to observe what they expect to observe). A historical example is the belief that the legs of a galloping horse are splayed at the point when none of the horse's legs touch the ground, to the point of this image being included in paintings by its supporters. However, the first stop-action pictures of a horse's gallop by Eadweard Muybridge showed this to be false, and that the legs are instead gathered together. Another important human bias that plays a role is a preference for new, surprising statements (see Appeal to novelty), which can result in a search for evidence that the new is true. Poorly attested beliefs can be believed and acted upon via a less rigorous heuristic. Goldhaber and Nieto published in 2010 the observation that if theoretical structures with \"many closely neighboring subjects are described by connecting theoretical concepts, then the theoretical structure acquires a robustness which makes it increasingly hard though certainly never impossible to overturn\". When a narrative is constructed its elements become easier to believe. notes \"Words and ideas are originally phonetic and mental equivalences of the experiences coinciding with them. ... Such proto-ideas are at first always too broad and insufficiently specialized. ... Once a structurally complete and closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that contradicts it\". Sometimes, these relations have their elements assumed a priori, or contain some other logical or methodological flaw in the process that ultimately produced them. Donald M. MacKay has analyzed these elements in terms of limits to the accuracy of measurement and has related them to instrumental elements in a category of measurement. ===Certainty, probabilities, and statistical inference=== Claims of scientific truth can be opposed in three ways: by falsifying them, by questioning their certainty, or by asserting the claim itself to be incoherent. Incoherence, here, means internal errors in logic, like stating opposites to be true; falsification is what Popper would have called the honest work of conjecture and refutation — certainty, perhaps, is where difficulties in telling truths from non-truths arise most easily. Scientific measurements include uncertainty estimates, calculated through repeated measurements, error propagation from underlying quantities, or sampling limitations. uncertainty. Counts of things may represent a sample of desired quantities, with an uncertainty that depends upon the sampling method used and the number of samples taken. In the case of measurement imprecision, there will simply be a 'probable deviation' expressing itself in a study's conclusions. Statistics are different. Inductive statistical generalisation will take sample data and extrapolate more general conclusions, which has to be justified — and scrutinised. It can even be said that statistical models are only ever useful, but never a complete representation of circumstances. In statistical analysis, expected and unexpected bias is a large factor. Research questions, the collection of data, or the interpretation of results, all are subject to larger amounts of scrutiny than in comfortably logical environments. Statistical models go through a process for validation, for which one could even say that awareness of potential biases is more important than the hard logic; errors in logic are easier to find in peer review, after all. More general, claims to rational knowledge, and especially statistics, have to be put into their appropriate context. Simple statements such as '9 out of 10 doctors recommend' are therefore of unknown quality because they do not justify their methodology. Lack of familiarity with statistical methodologies can result in erroneous conclusions. Foregoing the easy example, multiple probabilities interacting is where, for example medical professionals, have shown a lack of proper understanding. Bayes' theorem is the mathematical principle lining out how standing probabilities are adjusted given new information. The boy or girl paradox is a common example. In knowledge representation, Bayesian estimation of mutual information between random variables is a way to measure dependence, independence, or interdependence of the information under scrutiny. Beyond commonly associated survey methodology of field research, the concept together with probabilistic reasoning is used to advance fields of science where research objects have no definitive states of being. For example, in statistical mechanics. ==Methods of inquiry== ===Hypothetico-deductive method=== The hypothetico-deductive model, or hypothesis-testing method, or \"traditional\" scientific method is, as the name implies, based on the formation of hypotheses and their testing via deductive reasoning. A hypothesis stating implications, often called predictions, that are falsifiable via experiment is of central importance here, as not the hypothesis but its implications are what is tested. Basically, scientists will look at the hypothetical consequences a (potential) theory holds and prove or disprove those instead of the theory itself. If an experimental test of those hypothetical consequences shows them to be false, it follows logically that the part of the theory that implied them was false also. If they show as true however, it does not prove the theory definitively. The logic of this testing is what affords this method of inquiry to be reasoned deductively. The formulated hypothesis is assumed to be 'true', and from that 'true' statement implications are inferred. If the following tests show the implications to be false, it follows that the hypothesis was false also. If test show the implications to be true, new insights will be gained. It is important to be aware that a positive test here will at best strongly imply but not definitively prove the tested hypothesis, as deductive inference (A ⇒ B) is not equivalent like that; only (¬B ⇒ ¬A) is valid logic. Their positive outcomes however, as Hempel put it, provide \"at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it\". This is why Popper insisted on fielded hypotheses to be falsifieable, as successful tests imply very little otherwise. As Gillies put it, \"successful theories are those that survive elimination through falsification\". Deductive reasoning in this mode of inquiry will sometimes be replaced by abductive reasoning—the search for the most plausible explanation via logical inference. For example, in biology, where general laws are few, as valid deductions rely on solid presuppositions. ===Inductive method=== The inductivist approach to deriving scientific truth first rose to prominence with Francis Bacon and particularly with Isaac Newton and those who followed him. After the establishment of the HD-method, it was often put aside as something of a \"fishing expedition\" though. It is still valid to some degree, but today's inductive method is often far removed from the historic approach—the scale of the data collected lending new effectiveness to the method. It is most-associated with data-mining projects or large-scale observation projects. In both these cases, it is often not at all clear what the results of proposed experiments will be, and thus knowledge will arise after the collection of data through inductive reasoning. Where the traditional method of inquiry does both, the inductive approach usually formulates only a research question, not a hypothesis. Following the initial question instead, a suitable \"high-throughput method\" of data-collection is determined, the resulting data processed and 'cleaned up', and conclusions drawn after. \"This shift in focus elevates the data to the supreme role of revealing novel insights by themselves\". The advantage the inductive method has over methods formulating a hypothesis that it is essentially free of \"a researcher's preconceived notions\" regarding their subject. On the other hand, inductive reasoning is always attached to a measure of certainty, as all inductively reasoned conclusions are. This measure of certainty can reach quite high degrees, though. For example, in the determination of large primes, which are used in encryption software. ===Mathematical modelling=== Mathematical modelling, or allochthonous reasoning, typically is the formulation of a hypothesis followed by building mathematical constructs that can be tested in place of conducting physical laboratory experiments. This approach has two main factors: simplification/abstraction and secondly a set of correspondence rules. The correspondence rules lay out how the constructed model will relate back to reality-how truth is derived; and the simplifying steps taken in the abstraction of the given system are to reduce factors that do not bear relevance and thereby reduce unexpected errors. These steps can also help the researcher in understanding the important factors of the system, how far parsimony can be taken until the system becomes more and more unchangeable and thereby stable. Parsimony and related principles are further explored below. Once this translation into mathematics is complete, the resulting model, in place of the corresponding system, can be analysed through purely mathematical and computational means. The results of this analysis are of course also purely mathematical in nature and get translated back to the system as it exists in reality via the previously determined correspondence rules—iteration following review and interpretation of the findings. The way such models are reasoned will often be mathematically deductive—but they don't have to be. An example here are Monte-Carlo simulations. These generate empirical data \"arbitrarily\", and, while they may not be able to reveal universal principles, they can nevertheless be useful. ==Scientific inquiry== Scientific inquiry generally aims to obtain knowledge in the form of testable explanations that scientists can use to predict the results of future experiments. This allows scientists to gain a better understanding of the topic under study, and later to use that understanding to intervene in its causal mechanisms (such as to cure disease). The better an explanation is at making predictions, the more useful it frequently can be, and the more likely it will continue to explain a body of evidence better than its alternatives. The most successful explanations – those that explain and make accurate predictions in a wide range of circumstances – are often called scientific theories. Most experimental results do not produce large changes in human understanding; improvements in theoretical scientific understanding typically result from a gradual process of development over time, sometimes across different domains of science. Scientific models vary in the extent to which they have been experimentally tested and for how long, and in their acceptance in the scientific community. In general, explanations become accepted over time as evidence accumulates on a given topic, and the explanation in question proves more powerful than its alternatives at explaining the evidence. Often subsequent researchers re-formulate the explanations over time, or combined explanations to produce new explanations. ===Properties of scientific inquiry=== Scientific knowledge is closely tied to empirical findings and can remain subject to falsification if new experimental observations are incompatible with what is found. That is, no theory can ever be considered final since new problematic evidence might be discovered. If such evidence is found, a new theory may be proposed, or (more commonly) it is found that modifications to the previous theory are sufficient to explain the new evidence. The strength of a theory relates to how long it has persisted without major alteration to its core principles. Theories can also become subsumed by other theories. For example, Newton's laws explained thousands of years of scientific observations of the planets almost perfectly. However, these laws were then determined to be special cases of a more general theory (relativity), which explained both the (previously unexplained) exceptions to Newton's laws and predicted and explained other observations such as the deflection of light by gravity. Thus, in certain cases independent, unconnected, scientific observations can be connected, unified by principles of increasing explanatory power. Since new theories might be more comprehensive than what preceded them, and thus be able to explain more than previous ones, successor theories might be able to meet a higher standard by explaining a larger body of observations than their predecessors. For example, the theory of evolution explains the diversity of life on Earth, how species adapt to their environments, and many other patterns observed in the natural world; its most recent major modification was unification with genetics to form the modern evolutionary synthesis. In subsequent modifications, it has also subsumed aspects of many other fields such as biochemistry and molecular biology. ==Heuristics== ==Philosophy and discourse== Philosophy of science looks at the underpinning logic of the scientific method, at what separates science from non-science, and the ethic that is implicit in science. There are basic assumptions, derived from philosophy by at least one prominent scientist, that form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world. These assumptions from methodological naturalism form a basis on which science may be grounded. Logical positivist, empiricist, falsificationist, and other theories have criticized these assumptions and given alternative accounts of the logic of science, but each has also itself been criticized. There are several kinds of modern philosophical conceptualizations and attempts at definitions of the method of science. The one attempted by the unificationists, who argue for the existence of a unified definition that is useful (or at least 'works' in every context of science). The pluralists, arguing degrees of science being too fractured for a universal definition of its method to by useful. And those, who argue that the very attempt at definition is already detrimental to the free flow of ideas. Additionally, there have been views on the social framework in which science is done, and the impact of the sciences social environment on research. Also, there is 'scientific method' as popularised by Dewey in How We Think (1910) and Karl Pearson in Grammar of Science (1892), as used in fairly uncritical manner in education. ===Sociology of knowledge=== The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those ideas arise. ====Thought collectives==== A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is Fleck's thought, echoed in Kuhn's concept of normal science. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called thought collectives. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group. Comparably, following the field research in an academic scientific laboratory by Latour and Woolgar, Karin Knorr Cetina has conducted a comparative study of two scientific fields (namely high energy physics and molecular biology) to conclude that the epistemic practices and reasonings within both scientific communities are different enough to introduce the concept of \"epistemic cultures\", in contradiction with the idea that a so-called \"scientific method\" is unique and a unifying concept. ====Situated cognition and relativism==== On the idea of Fleck's thought collectives sociologists built the concept of situated cognition: that the perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views. Norwood Russell Hanson, alongside Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, extensively explored the theory-laden nature of observation in science. Hanson introduced the concept in 1958, emphasizing that observation is influenced by the observer's conceptual framework. He used the concept of gestalt to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description, and illustrated this with examples like the initial rejection of Golgi bodies as an artefact of staining technique, and the differing interpretations of the same sunrise by Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. Intersubjectivity led to different conclusions. Kuhn and Feyerabend acknowledged Hanson's pioneering work, although Feyerabend's views on methodological pluralism were more radical. Criticisms like those from Kuhn and Feyerabend prompted discussions leading to the development of the strong programme, a sociological approach that seeks to explain scientific knowledge without recourse to the truth or validity of scientific theories. It examines how scientific beliefs are shaped by social factors such as power, ideology, and interests. The postmodernist critiques of science have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the science wars, is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between postmodernist and realist perspectives. Postmodernists argue that scientific knowledge is merely a discourse, devoid of any claim to fundamental truth. In contrast, realists within the scientific community maintain that science uncovers real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate way of deriving truth. ==Limits of method== ===Role of chance in discovery=== . One of his bacteria cultures got contaminated with mould in which surroundings the bacteria had died off; thereby the method of discovery was simply knowing what to look out for. Somewhere between 33% and 50% of all scientific discoveries are estimated to have been stumbled upon, rather than sought out. This may explain why scientists so often express that they were lucky. Scientists themselves in the 19th and 20th century acknowledged the role of fortunate luck or serendipity in discoveries. Louis Pasteur is credited with the famous saying that \"Luck favours the prepared mind\", but some psychologists have begun to study what it means to be 'prepared for luck' in the scientific context. Research is showing that scientists are taught various heuristics that tend to harness chance and the unexpected. This is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls \"Anti-fragility\"; while some systems of investigation are fragile in the face of human error, human bias, and randomness, the scientific method is more than resistant or tough – it actually benefits from such randomness in many ways (it is anti-fragile). Taleb believes that the more anti-fragile the system, the more it will flourish in the real world. Psychologist Kevin Dunbar says the process of discovery often starts with researchers finding bugs in their experiments. These unexpected results lead researchers to try to fix what they think is an error in their method. Eventually, the researcher decides the error is too persistent and systematic to be a coincidence. The highly controlled, cautious, and curious aspects of the scientific method are thus what make it well suited for identifying such persistent systematic errors. At this point, the researcher will begin to think of theoretical explanations for the error, often seeking the help of colleagues across different domains of expertise. ===Science of complex systems=== Science applied to complex systems can involve elements such as transdisciplinarity, systems theory, control theory, and scientific modelling. In general, the scientific method may be difficult to apply stringently to diverse, interconnected systems and large data sets. In particular, practices used within Big data, such as predictive analytics, may be considered to be at odds with the scientific method, as some of the data may have been stripped of the parameters which might be material in alternative hypotheses for an explanation; thus the stripped data would only serve to support the null hypothesis in the predictive analytics application. notes \"a scientific discovery remains incomplete without considerations of the social practices that condition it\". ==Relationship with mathematics== Science is the process of gathering, comparing, and evaluating proposed models against observables. A model can be a simulation, mathematical or chemical formula, or set of proposed steps. Science is like mathematics in that researchers in both disciplines try to distinguish what is known from what is unknown at each stage of discovery. Models, in both science and mathematics, need to be internally consistent and also ought to be falsifiable (capable of disproof). In mathematics, a statement need not yet be proved; at such a stage, that statement would be called a conjecture. Mathematical work and scientific work can inspire each other. For example, the technical concept of time arose in science, and timelessness was a hallmark of a mathematical topic. But today, the Poincaré conjecture has been proved using time as a mathematical concept in which objects can flow (see Ricci flow). Nevertheless, the connection between mathematics and reality (and so science to the extent it describes reality) remains obscure. Eugene Wigner's paper, \"The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences\", is a very well-known account of the issue from a Nobel Prize-winning physicist. In fact, some observers (including some well-known mathematicians such as Gregory Chaitin, and others such as Lakoff and Núñez) have suggested that mathematics is the result of practitioner bias and human limitation (including cultural ones), somewhat like the post-modernist view of science. George Pólya's work on problem solving, the construction of mathematical proofs, and heuristic show that the mathematical method and the scientific method differ in detail, while nevertheless resembling each other in using iterative or recursive steps. In Pólya's view, understanding involves restating unfamiliar definitions in your own words, resorting to geometrical figures, and questioning what we know and do not know already; analysis, which Pólya takes from Pappus, involves free and heuristic construction of plausible arguments, working backward from the goal, and devising a plan for constructing the proof; synthesis is the strict Euclidean exposition of step-by-step details of the proof; review involves reconsidering and re-examining the result and the path taken to it. Building on Pólya's work, Imre Lakatos argued that mathematicians actually use contradiction, criticism, and revision as principles for improving their work. In like manner to science, where truth is sought, but certainty is not found, in Proofs and Refutations, what Lakatos tried to establish was that no theorem of informal mathematics is final or perfect. This means that, in non-axiomatic mathematics, we should not think that a theorem is ultimately true, only that no counterexample has yet been found. Once a counterexample, i.e. an entity contradicting/not explained by the theorem is found, we adjust the theorem, possibly extending the domain of its validity. This is a continuous way our knowledge accumulates, through the logic and process of proofs and refutations. (However, if axioms are given for a branch of mathematics, this creates a logical system —Wittgenstein 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.13; Lakatos claimed that proofs from such a system were tautological, i.e. internally logically true, by rewriting forms, as shown by Poincaré, who demonstrated the technique of transforming tautologically true forms (viz. the Euler characteristic) into or out of forms from homology, or more abstractly, from homological algebra. Lakatos proposed an account of mathematical knowledge based on Polya's idea of heuristics. In Proofs and Refutations, Lakatos gave several basic rules for finding proofs and counterexamples to conjectures. He thought that mathematical 'thought experiments' are a valid way to discover mathematical conjectures and proofs. Gauss, when asked how he came about his theorems, once replied \"durch planmässiges Tattonieren\" (through systematic palpable experimentation). ==See also== , and systematic inventive thinking (SIT) Outline of scientific method Methodology (Study of research) and the scientific study of science (metascience) Research transparency and bias Scientific protocol ==Notes== ===Notes: Philosophical expressions of method=== ==References== ===Footnotes=== ===Sources=== , also published by Dover, 1964. From the Waynflete Lectures, 1948. On the web. N.B.: the web version does not have the 3 addenda by Born, 1950, 1964, in which he notes that all knowledge is subjective. Born then proposes a solution in Appendix 3 (1964) . . Reviewed in: Public domain in the US. 236 pages . . . (written in German, 1935, Entstehung und Entwickelung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollectiv) English translation by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Fred Bradley, 1979 Edited by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton. Foreword by Robert K. Merton . English translation: Additional publication information is from the collection of first editions of the Library of Congress surveyed by . . . . 1877, 1879. Reprinted with a foreword by Ernst Nagel, New York, 1958. 2nd edition 2007. . Memoir of a researcher in the Avery–MacLeod–McCarty experiment. . . , Third edition. From I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman's 1999 translation. . Translated to English by Karen Jelved, Andrew D. Jackson, and Ole Knudsen, (translators 1997). Peirce, C.S. – see Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography. . ( . . . . . Reviewed in . Critical edition. . ==Further reading== Bauer, Henry H., Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL, 1992 Beveridge, William I.B., The Art of Scientific Investigation, Heinemann, Melbourne, Australia, 1950. Bernstein, Richard J., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1983. Brody, Baruch A. and Capaldi, Nicholas, Science: Men, Methods, Goals: A Reader: Methods of Physical Science , W.A. Benjamin, 1968 Brody, Baruch A. and Grandy, Richard E., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989. Burks, Arthur W., Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977. Chalmers, Alan, What Is This Thing Called Science?. Queensland University Press and Open University Press, 1976. . Earman, John (ed.), Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA, 1992. Fraassen, Bas C. van, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980. . Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Reason in the Age of Science, Frederick G. Lawrence (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981. Giere, Ronald N. (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science, vol. 15 in 'Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science', University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1992. Hacking, Ian, Representing and Intervening, Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. Heisenberg, Werner, Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations, A.J. Pomerans (trans.), Harper and Row, New York, 1971, pp.&nbsp;63–64. Holton, Gerald, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein, 1st edition 1973, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988. Karin Knorr Cetina, Kuhn, Thomas S., The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977. Latour, Bruno, Science in Action, How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. Losee, John, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972. 2nd edition, 1980. Maxwell, Nicholas, The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Paperback 2003. Maxwell, Nicholas, Understanding Scientific Progress , Paragon House, St. Paul, Minnesota, 2017. Misak, Cheryl J., Truth and the End of Inquiry, A Peircean Account of Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. Oreskes, Naomi, \"Masked Confusion: A trusted source of health information misleads the public by prioritizing rigor over reality\", Scientific American, vol. 329, no. 4 (November 2023), pp.&nbsp;90–91. Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo (ed.), Language and Learning, The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980. Popper, Karl R., Unended Quest, An Intellectual Autobiography, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1982. Putnam, Hilary, Renewing Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979. Salmon, Wesley C., Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1990. Shimony, Abner, Search for a Naturalistic World View: Vol. 1, Scientific Method and Epistemology, Vol. 2, Natural Science and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. Thagard, Paul, Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992. Ziman, John (2000). Real Science: what it is, and what it means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ==External links== An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and a scientific method by Steven D. Schafersman. Introduction to the scientific method at the University of Rochester The scientific method from a philosophical perspective Theory-ladenness by Paul Newall at The Galilean Library Lecture on Scientific Method by Greg Anderson (archived 28 April 2006) Using the scientific method for designing science fair projects Scientific Methods an online book by Richard D. Jarrard Richard Feynman on the Key to Science (one minute, three seconds), from the Cornell Lectures. Lectures on the Scientific Method by Nick Josh Karean, Kevin Padian, Michael Shermer and Richard Dawkins (archived 11 May 2013). \"How Do We Know What Is True?\" (animated video; 2:52)",
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