Scientific realism
Scientific realism is the philosophical view that the universe described by science (including both observable and unobservable aspects) exists independently of perception, and that verified scientific theories are at least approximately…
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Scientific realism is the philosophical view that the universe described by science (including both observable and unobservable aspects) exists independently of perception, and that verified scientific theories are at least approximately true descriptions of what is real. Scientific realists typically assert that science, when successful, uncovers true (or approximately true) knowledge about nature, including aspects of reality that are not directly observable.
Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories.
Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism. In a 2020 PhilPapers Survey 72% of academic philosophers favored scientific realism vs only 15% favoring antirealism.
Main features
Scientific realism involves two basic positions: Ideal-theory thesis. It offers a set of criteria for an ideal scientific theory; one that science aims to approximate. Convergence thesis.
It maintains that, in at least some well-established domains, the theories scientists now accept already approximate that ideal and will do so ever more closely as inquiry progresses. Realists often adopt this theses selectively; one may be realist about mature fields such as fundamental physics while remaining agnostic about less-settled areas.
An ideal scientific theory, on the realist view, satisfies three interconnected commitments: Semantic: Its central claims are either true or false because they purport to describe the real world. Metaphysical: The entities it posits (e.g. electrons, genes) exist objectively and independent of the mind.
Epistemic: We have good reason to believe many of those claims because the theory's explanatory and predictive success would be improbable if they were not at least approximately true. Taken together, the first two commitments imply that an ideal theory makes definite assertions about genuinely existent entities, while the third justifies believing a significant subset of those assertions.
Realists therefore argue that science progresses: later theories generally answer more questions or do so more accurately, thus moving closer, though never necessarily reaching, the ideal of a literally true account of nature.
Characteristic claims
The following claims are typical of those held by scientific realists. Due to the wide disagreements over the nature of science's success and the role of realism in its success, a scientific realist would agree with some but not all of the following positions. The best scientific theories are at least partially true.
The best theories do not employ central terms that are non referring expressions. To say that a theory is approximately true is sufficient explanation of the degree of its predictive success. The approximate truth of a theory is the only explanation of its predictive success.
Even if a theory employs expressions that do not have a reference, a scientific theory may be approximately true. Scientific theories are in a historical process of progress towards a true account of the physical world. Scientific theories make genuine, existential claims.
Theoretical claims of scientific theories should be read literally and are definitively either true or false. The degree of the predictive success of a theory is evidence of the referential success of its central terms. The goal of science is an account of the physical world that is literally true.
Science has been successful because this is the goal that it has been making progress towards.
History
Scientific realism is related to much older philosophical positions including rationalism and metaphysical realism. However, it is a thesis about science developed in the twentieth century. Portraying scientific realism in terms of its ancient, medieval, and early modern cousins is at best misleading.
Scientific realism is developed largely as a reaction to logical positivism. Logical positivism was the first philosophy of science in the twentieth century and the forerunner of scientific realism, holding that a sharp distinction can be drawn between theoretical terms and observational terms, the latter capable of semantic analysis in observational and logical terms.
Logical positivism encountered difficulties with: The verificationist theory of meaning—see Hempel (1950). Troubles with the analytic-synthetic distinction—see Quine (1950). The theory-ladenness of observation—see Hanson (1958) Kuhn (1970) and Quine (1960).
Difficulties moving from the observationality of terms to observationality of sentences—see Putnam (1962). The vagueness of the observational-theoretical distinction—see G. Maxwell (1962). These difficulties for logical positivism suggest, but do not entail, scientific realism, and led to the development of realism as a philosophy of science.
Realism became the dominant philosophy of science after positivism. Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image (1980) developed constructive empiricism as an alternative to realism. He argues against scientific realism that scientific theories do not aim for truth about unobservable entities.
Responses to van Fraassen have sharpened realist positions and led to some revisions of scientific realism.
See also
Anti-realism Constructivist epistemology Critical realism (philosophy of perception) Dialectical materialism Instrumentalism Musgrave's scientific realism Naïve realism Pessimistic induction Scientific materialism Scientific perspectivism Scientific skepticism Scientism Social constructionism
Further reading
Boyd, R. N. (1988). "How to Be A Moral Realist", in G. Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism, Cornell University Press, pp. 181–228. Bunge, Mario.
(2006). Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism. Toronto Studies in Philosophy: University of Toronto Press Bunge, Mario.
(2001). Scientific Realism: Selected Essays of Mario Bunge. Mahner, M. (Ed.) New York: Prometheus Books Devitt, Michael, "Scientific realism".
In: Oxford handbook of contemporary analytic philosophy (2005) Hempel, Carl. (1950). "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" in Boyd, Richard et al. eds. (1990).
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge: MIT Press.. Hunt, Shelby D. (2003). "Controversy in Marketing Theory: For Reason, Realism, Truth, and Objectivity."
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Hunt Shelby D. (2011). "Theory Status, Inductive Realism, And Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25(2), 159–178.
Kukla, A. (2000). Social constructivism and the philosophy of science. London: Routledge.
Kuhn, Thomas. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edition.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Laudan, Larry. (1981).
"A Confutation of Convergent Realism" Philosophy of Science Leplin, Jarrett. (1984). Scientific Realism.
California: University of California Press. Leplin, Jarrett. (1997).
A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lipton, Peter.
(2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd edition. London: Routledge.
Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities" in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time vol. 3, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3-15. Merritt, D. (2023).
"Touching Reality". A critique of scientific realism in the context of cosmology. Okasha, Samir.
(2002). Philosophy of science: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
See especially chapter 4, "Realism and Anti-Realism." Putnam, Hilary. (1962).
"What Theories are Not" in Ernst Nagel et al. (1962). Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Stanford University Press. Psillos, Stathis.
(1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.
Quine, W.V.O. (1951). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in his (1953)From a Logical Point of View Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Quine, W.V.O. (1960).
Word and Object Cambridge: MIT Press. Sankey, H. (2001). "Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defense" retrieved from [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu
External links
Scientific Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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