Sino-Soviet split
the breaking of political relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
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Sino-Soviet split. encyclopegia.org, snapshot sino-soviet-split-058257-baf43bf99eac1567. /a/sino-soviet-split
Names in other languages
- Polskirozłam radziecko-chiński
- Françaisrupture sino-soviétique
- Españolruptura sino-soviética
- עבריתהפיצול הסיני-סובייטי
- EnglishSino-Soviet split
- 한국어중소 분쟁
- 简体中文中苏交恶
- 繁體中文中蘇交惡
- 中文中蘇交惡
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
The Sino-Soviet split was the gradual worsening of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. This was primarily caused by divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective geopolitics during the Cold War of 1947–1991.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of orthodox Marxism became specific disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the Western Bloc, which Chinese leader Mao Zedong decried as revisionism. Against that ideological background, China took a belligerent stance towards the Western world, and publicly rejected the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc.
In addition, China resented the Soviet Union's growing ties with India due to factors such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, while the Soviet Union feared that Mao was unconcerned about the drastic consequences of nuclear warfare. In 19561, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin and Stalinism in the speech "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" and began the de-Stalinization of the USSR. Mao and the Chinese leadership were appalled as the PRC and the USSR progressively diverged in their interpretations and applications of Leninist theory.
By 1961, their intractable ideological differences provoked the PRC's formal denunciation of Soviet communism as the work of "revisionist traitors" in the USSR. The PRC also declared the Soviet Union social imperialist. The Soviet Union, in turn, criticized Mao Zedong and China's practices during the subsequent Cultural Revolution.
For Eastern Bloc countries, the Sino-Soviet split was a question of who would lead the revolution for world communism, and to whom (China or the USSR) the vanguard parties of the world would turn for political advice, financial aid, and military assistance. In that vein, both countries competed for the leadership of world communism through the revolutionary parties native to the countries in their spheres of influence.
The conflict culminated after the Zhenbao Island border incident in 1969, after which the Soviet Union reportedly considered the possibility of launching a large-scale nuclear strike against China, and the Chinese leadership, including Mao, was evacuated from Beijing, before both sides eventually returned to diplomatic negotiations. In the Western world, the Sino-Soviet split transformed the bi-polar cold war into a tri-polar cold war.
The rivalry facilitated Mao's realization of Sino-American rapprochement with the US president Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In the West, the policies of triangular diplomacy and linkage emerged.
Like the Tito–Stalin split, the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split also weakened the concept of monolithic communism, the Western perception that the communist nations were ideologically, and therefore politically, united. However, the USSR and China both continued to cooperate with North Vietnam during the Vietnam War into the 1970s, despite rivalry elsewhere.
Historically, the Sino-Soviet split facilitated the Marxist–Leninist Realpolitik with which Mao established the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC–USA–USSR) of the late-period Cold War (1956–1991) to create an anti-Soviet front, which Maoists connected to the Three Worlds Theory. According to Lüthi, there is "no documentary evidence that the Chinese or the Soviets thought about their relationship within a triangular framework during the period."
Khrushchev's criticism of Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress
were united in both their stance against Revisionism as well as ideologically upholding Stalin. In June 1960, at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced the People's Republic of Albania as a politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism.
In turn, Bao Sansan said that the CCP's message to the cadres in China was: "When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, Hoxha said to his people: 'Even if we have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won't take anything from Russia.' China is not guilty of chauvinism, and immediately sent food to our brother country."
During his opening speech at the CPSU's 22nd Party Congress on 17 October 1961 in Moscow, Khrushchev once again criticized Albania as a politically backward state and the Albanian Party of Labour as well as its leadership, including Enver Hoxha, for refusing to support reforms against Stalin's legacy, in addition to their criticism of rapprochement with Yugoslavia, leading to the Soviet–Albanian split. In response to this rebuke, on 19 October the delegation representing China at the Party Congress led by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sharply criticised Moscow's stance towards Tirana: "We hold that should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and according to the principles of equality and of unanimity through consultation.
Public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To bring a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist–Leninist attitude."
Subsequently, on 21 October, Zhou visited the Lenin Mausoleum (then still entombing Stalin's body), laying two wreaths at the base of the site, one of which read "Dedicated to the great Marxist, Comrade Stalin". On 23 October, the Chinese delegation left Moscow for Beijing early, before the Congress' conclusion; within days, Khrushchev had Stalin's body removed from the mausoleum.
Soviet Opposition to the People's Communes
In 1953, guided by Soviet economists, the PRC applied the USSR's model of command economy, which gave first priority to the development of heavy industry, and second priority to the production of consumer goods. Later, ignoring the guidance of technical advisors, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward to transform agrarian China into an industrialized country with disastrous results for people and land.
Mao's unrealistic goals for agricultural production went unfulfilled because of poor planning and realization, which aggravated rural starvation and increased the number of deaths caused by the Great Chinese Famine, which resulted from three years of drought and poor weather. An estimated 30 million Chinese people starved to death, more than any other famine in recorded history.
Mao and his government largely downplayed the deaths. In November 1958, Khrushchev met with Polish leader Władysław Gomułka, with official Polish records documenting Khrushchev's strong aversion to the People's Communes. Subsequently, Khrushchev drew parallels between China's People's Communes and the Soviet communes of the 1920s, deeming them erroneous practices.
In December 1958, it is alleged that Khrushchev once again criticised China's people's communes during a meeting with US Senator Hubert Humphrey. Khrushchev remarked, "They are old-fashioned, they are reactionary. We tried that right after the revolution.
It just doesn't work." In January 19591, during his visit to the United States, Anastas Mikoyan reiterated that "the Soviet Union had abandoned the kind of pure communes recently established in Communist China, because it was found that they would not function without an incentive system."
In July 1959, Khrushchev publicly criticised the establishment of communes during a mass rally in Poland. Polish newspapers omitted his criticism of the communes in their reports, whereas Pravda published the full text. However, Khrushchev's speech coincided with the Lushan Conference, and Mao Zedong was deeply displeased by Khrushchev's criticisms.
In the Romanian capital of Bucharest, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties (November 1960), Mao and Khrushchev respectively attacked the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations of Marxism-Leninism as the wrong road to world socialism in the USSR and in China. Mao said that Khrushchev's emphases on consumer goods and material plenty would make the Soviets ideologically soft and un-revolutionary, to which Khrushchev replied: "If we could promise the people nothing, except revolution, they would scratch their heads and say: 'Isn't it better to have good goulash?
The CWIHP Document Collection on the Sino-Soviet Split The Great Debate: Documents of the Sino-Soviet Split at Marxists Internet Archive
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1377533996 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
- ↩Wikipedia “Sino-Soviet split” date of establishment (×2) · confidence 0.95 revision URL