Six-Day War
The Six-Day War, or the 1967 Arab–Israeli war (5–10 June 1967), was fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, primarily Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
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The Six-Day War, or the 1967 Arab–Israeli war (5–10 June 1967), was fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, primarily Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the war, Israel captured and occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria.
Military hostilities broke out amid poor relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who had been observing the 1949 Armistice Agreements signed at the end of the First Arab–Israeli War. In 1956, regional tensions over the Straits of Tiran (giving access to Eilat, a port on Israel's southeastern tip) escalated in what became known as the Suez Crisis, when Israel, along with Britain and France, invaded Egypt over the Egyptian closure of maritime passageways to Israeli shipping, ultimately resulting in the reopening of the Straits of Tiran to Israel and the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) along the Egypt–Israel border.
In the months before June 1967, tensions again became dangerously heightened: Israel reiterated its post-1956 position that another Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping would be a definite casus belli. In May, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that the Straits of Tiran would again be closed to Israeli vessels.
He mobilized the Egyptian military into defensive lines along the border with Israel and ordered the immediate withdrawal of all UNEF personnel. The war began on 5 June 1967 with Operation Focus, an Israeli surprise attack consisting of a series of airstrikes against Egyptian airfields and other facilities as the UNEF was leaving the zone.
Israel caught Egyptian forces by surprise and destroyed nearly all of Egypt's air force, giving Israel air supremacy. Simultaneously, the Israeli military launched a ground offensive into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip.
After some initial resistance, Nasser ordered an evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula; by the fourth day of the conflict, Israel had occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula. Jordan, which had entered into a defense pact with Egypt a week before the war began, did not take on an all-out offensive role against Israel, but launched attacks against Israeli forces to slow their advance.
On the fifth day, Syria joined the war by shelling Israeli positions in the north. Egypt and Jordan agreed to a ceasefire on 8 June, and Syria on 9 June, and it was signed with Israel on 11 June. The Six-Day War resulted in more than 15,000 Arab fatalities; Israel suffered fewer than 1,000.
Alongside the combatant casualties were the deaths of 20 Israeli civilians killed in Arab forces air strikes on Jerusalem, 15 UN peacekeepers killed by Israeli strikes in the Sinai at the outset of the war, and 34 US personnel killed in the USS Liberty incident, in which Israeli air and naval forces mistakenly assaulted a United States Navy spy ship. When hostilities ceased, Israel had occupied the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank including East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt.
The displacement of civilian populations as a result of the Six-Day War had long-term consequences, as around 280,000 to 325,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Syrians fled or were expelled from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, respectively. Nasser resigned in shame after Israel's victory, but was reinstated after a series of protests across Egypt.
In the aftermath of the conflict, Egypt closed the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975.
Egyptian control of Jordanian forces
King Hussein gave of his army to Egypt on 1 June, on which date Egyptian General Riad arrived in Amman to take control of the Jordanian military. Egyptian Field Marshal Amer used the confusion of the conflict's first hours to cable to Amman that he was victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting of a squadron of Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which he said was an Egyptian aircraft en route to attack Israel.
In this cable, sent shortly before 9:00 a.m., Riad was ordered to attack.
Initial attack
One of the Jordanian brigades stationed in the West Bank was sent to the Hebron area to link with the Egyptians. The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against Egypt.
Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began taking place in Jerusalem at 9:30 a.m., and the fighting gradually escalated as the Jordanians introduced mortar and recoilless rifle fire. On General Narkis's orders, the Israelis responded only with small-arms fire, firing in a flat trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites, or the Old City.
At 10:00 a.m. on 5 June, the Jordanian Army began shelling Israel. Two batteries of 155-mm Long Tom cannons opened fire on the suburbs of Tel Aviv and Ramat David Airbase. The commanders of these batteries were instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel.
Some shells hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv. By 10:30 a.m., Eshkol had sent King Hussein a message via Odd Bull promising not to initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of the war. Hussein replied that it was too late and "the die was cast".
At 11:15 a.m., Jordanian howitzers began a 6,000-shell barrage at Israeli Jerusalem. The Jordanians initially targeted kibbutz Ramat Rachel in the south and Mount Scopus in the north, then ranged into the city center and outlying neighborhoods. Military installations, the Prime Minister's Residence, and the Knesset compound were also targeted.
Jordanian forces shelled the Beit HaNassi and the Biblical Zoo, killing 15 civilians. Israeli civilian casualties totalled 20 dead and over 1,000 wounded. Some 900 buildings were damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital, which had its Chagall-made windows destroyed.
Around midday, eight Iraqi Hawker Hunters attacked the Kfar Sirkin airfield, destroying a Noratlas transport aircraft and a Piper Super Cub. Four Jordanian Hunters also hit a factory hall in Netanya, killing one civilian and wounding seven.
Israeli attack: first day (9 June)
On the morning of 9 June, Israeli jets began carrying out dozens of sorties against Syrian positions from Mount Hermon to Tawfiq, using rockets salvaged from captured Egyptian stocks. The airstrikes knocked out artillery batteries and storehouses and forced transport columns off the roads.
The Syrians suffered heavy casualties and a drop in morale, with some senior officers and troops deserting. The attacks also provided time as Israeli forces cleared paths through Syrian minefields. The airstrikes did not seriously damage the Syrians' bunkers and trench systems, and the bulk of Syrian forces on the Golan remained in their positions.
About two hours after the airstrikes began, the 8th Armored Brigade, led by Colonel Albert Mandler, advanced into the Golan Heights from Givat HaEm. Its advance was spearheaded by Engineering Corps sappers and eight bulldozers, which cleared away barbed wire and mines. As they advanced, the force came under fire, and five bulldozers were immediately hit.
The Israeli tanks, with their manoeuvrability sharply reduced by the terrain, advanced slowly under fire toward the fortified village of Sir al-Dib, with their ultimate objective being the fortress at Qala. Israeli casualties steadily mounted. Part of the attacking force lost its way and emerged opposite Za'ura, a redoubt manned by Syrian reservists.
With the situation critical, Colonel Mandler ordered simultaneous assaults on Za'ura and Qala. Heavy and confused fighting followed, with Israeli and Syrian tanks struggling around obstacles and firing at extremely short ranges.
Mandler recalled that "the Syrians fought well and bloodied us. We beat them only by crushing them under our treads and by blasting them with our cannons at very short range, from 100 to 500 meters." The first three Israeli tanks to enter Qala were stopped by a Syrian bazooka team, and a relief column of seven Syrian tanks arrived to repel the attackers.
The Israelis took heavy fire from the houses, but could not turn back, as other forces were advancing behind them, and they were on a narrow path with mines on either side. The Israelis continued pressing forward and called for air support. A pair of Israeli jets destroyed two of the Syrian tanks, and the remainder withdrew.
The surviving defenders of Qala retreated after their commander was killed. Meanwhile, Za'ura fell in an Israeli assault, and the Israelis also captured the 'Ein Fit fortress. In the central sector, the Israeli 181st Battalion captured the strongholds of Dardara and Tel Hillal after fierce fighting.
Desperate fighting also broke out along the operation's northern axis, where Golani Brigade attacked thirteen Syrian positions, including the formidable Tel Fakhr position. Navigational errors placed the Israelis directly under the Syrians' guns. In the fighting that followed, both sides took heavy casualties, with the Israelis losing all nineteen of their tanks and half-tracks.
The Israeli battalion commander then ordered his twenty-five remaining men to dismount, divide into two groups, and charge the northern and southern flanks of Tel Fakhr. The first Israelis to reach the perimeter of the southern approach laid on the barbed wire, allowing their comrades to vault over them. From there, they assaulted the fortified Syrian positions.
The fighting was waged at extremely close quarters, often hand-to-hand. On the northern flank, the Israelis broke through within minutes and cleared out the trenches and bunkers. During the seven-hour battle, the Israelis lost 31 dead and 82 wounded, while the Syrians lost 62 dead and 20 captured.
Among the dead was the Israeli battalion commander. The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion took Tel 'Azzaziat, and Darbashiya also fell to Israeli forces. from 9 June about the war and UN reactions. By the evening of 9 June, the four Israeli brigades had all broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.
Thousands of reinforcements began reaching the front, those tanks and half-tracks that had survived the previous day's fighting were refuelled and replenished with ammunition, and the wounded were evacuated. By dawn, the Israelis had eight brigades in the sector. Syria's first line of defense had been shattered, but the defenses beyond that remained largely intact.
Mount Hermon and the Banias in the north, and the entire sector between Tawfiq and Customs House Road in the south remained in Syrian hands. In a meeting early on the night of 9 June, Syrian leaders decided to reinforce those positions as quickly as possible and to maintain a steady barrage on Israeli civilian settlements.
Israeli attack: second day (10 June)
Throughout the night, the Israelis continued their advance, though it was slowed by fierce resistance. An anticipated Syrian counterattack never materialized.
At the fortified village of Jalabina, a garrison of Syrian reservists, levelling their anti-aircraft guns, held off the Israeli 65th Paratroop Battalion for four hours before a small detachment managed to penetrate the village and knock out the heavy guns. Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade's tanks moved south from Qala, advancing to Wasit under heavy artillery and tank bombardment.
At the Banias in the north, Syrian mortar batteries opened fire on advancing Israeli forces only after Golani Brigade sappers had cleared a path through a minefield, killing 16 Israeli soldiers and wounding four. On the next day, 10 June, the central and northern groups joined in a pincer movement on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces retreated.
At 8:30 a.m., the Syrians began blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents and retreating. Several units joined by Elad Peled's troops climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions mostly empty. When the 8th Brigade reached Mansura, from Wasit, the Israelis met no opposition and found abandoned equipment, including tanks, in perfect working condition.
In the fortified Banias village, Golani Brigade troops found only several Syrian soldiers chained to their positions. During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon ceasefire to occupy strategically strong positions.
To the east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the ceasefire line known as the "Purple Line". Time magazine reported: "In an effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire, Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of the city of Quneitra three hours before it actually capitulated.
That premature report of the surrender of their headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan area."
Casualties and Losses
Between 776 and 983 Israelis were killed and 4,517 were wounded. Fifteen Israeli soldiers were captured. Arab casualties were far greater.
Between 9,800 and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were listed as killed or missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were captured. Jordanian losses are estimated to be 700 killed in action with another 2,500 wounded.
The Syrians were estimated to have sustained between 1,000 and 2,500 killed in action. Between 367 and 591 Syrians were captured. Casualties were also suffered by UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force that was stationed on the Egyptian side of the border.
In three different episodes, Israeli forces attacked a UNEF convoy, camps in which UNEF personnel were concentrated and the UNEF headquarters in Gaza, resulting in one Brazilian peacekeeper and 14 Indian officials killed by Israeli forces, with an additional seventeen peacekeepers wounded in both contingents. Regarding material losses, 46 Israeli aircraft and 400 tanks were destroyed.
Egyptian losses were reported at 700 tanks according to President Nasser, although Israeli officials claimed to have destroyed 509 Egyptian tanks. Egyptian aircraft losses range from 282 to 350. Syria lost close to 60 aircraft.
Jordanian losses accounted to 21, including 17 military aircraft, 1 helicopter and 3 passenger aircraft. Iraq lost 9 aircraft; Lebanon lost one.
Exodus of Arabs from Israeli-occupied territories
Populations in the occupied territories were extensively displaced: of about one million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 280,000 to 325,000 were displaced from their homes. Most of them settled in Jordan. The other 700,000 remained.
In the Golan Heights, over 100,000 fled. Israel allowed only the inhabitants of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights to receive full Israeli citizenship, applying its law, administration and jurisdiction to these territories in 1967 and 1981, respectively. The vast majority of the populations in both territories declined to take citizenship.
In his 1999 book Righteous Victims, Israeli "New Historian" Benny Morris writes: In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Golan Heights, of whom about 20,000 were from the city of Quneitra. According to research by Haaretz, a total of 130,000 Syrian inhabitants fled or were expelled from the territory, most of them pushed out by the Israeli army.
File:Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge during the second Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1967.jpg|Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge File:Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge during the 1967 hostilities.tif|Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge File:Expulsion of Syrians from Golan Heights.jpg|Syrian civilians with their hands raised being expelled from the Golan Heights by Israeli soldiers
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References
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