Tigray war
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The Tigray war was an armed conflict that lasted from 3 November 2020 to 3 November 20221. It was a civil war primarily fought in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia between forces allied with the Ethiopian federal government and Eritrea on one side, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) on the other.
After years of increased tensions and hostilities between the TPLF and the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, fighting began when TPLF forces attacked the Northern Command headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), alongside a number of other bases in Tigray. The ENDF counterattacked from the south – while Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) began launching attacks from the north – which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described as a "law enforcement operation".
Federal allied forces captured Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray Region, on 28 November, after which Abiy declared the operation "over." However, the TPLF stated soon afterwards that it would continue fighting until the "invaders" were out, and on 28 June 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) retook Mekelle; by July the same year, they had also advanced into the Amhara and Afar regions.…
The Tigray war was an armed conflict that lasted from 3 November 2020 to 3 November 2022. It was a civil war primarily fought in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia between forces allied with the Ethiopian federal government and Eritrea on one side, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) on the other.
After years of increased tensions and hostilities between the TPLF and the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, fighting began when TPLF forces attacked the Northern Command headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), alongside a number of other bases in Tigray. The ENDF counterattacked from the south – while Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) began launching attacks from the north – which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described as a "law enforcement operation".
Federal allied forces captured Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray Region, on 28 November, after which Abiy declared the operation "over." However, the TPLF stated soon afterwards that it would continue fighting until the "invaders" were out, and on 28 June 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) retook Mekelle; by July the same year, they had also advanced into the Amhara and Afar regions.
In early November 2021, the TDF, together with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), took control of several towns on the highway south from Tigray Region towards Addis Ababa, and the TPLF stated that it considered "marching on [the capital]." Together with seven smaller rebel groups, the TPLF and OLA declared a coalition aiming to "dismantle Abiy's government by force or by negotiations, and then form a transitional authority."
After a successful government counter-offensive in response, and then a series of negotiations with the TPLF, Ethiopia declared an indefinite humanitarian truce on 24 March 2022, in order to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray. However, fighting dramatically re-escalated in late August 2022, after peace talks broke down.
Rapid mobilization of troops soon followed, with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray reportedly organizing hundreds of thousands of troops against each other by October the same year. After a number of peace and mediation proposals in the intervening years, Ethiopia and the Tigrayan rebel forces agreed to a cessation of hostilities on 2 November, which went into effect the day after; Eritrea was not a party to the agreement, however, and it largely continued to occupy parts of Tigray as of 2023.
All sides, particularly the ENDF, EDF, Amhara forces and TDF, committed war crimes during the conflict. Mass extrajudicial killings of civilians took place throughout, including in Axum, Bora, Chenna, Kobo, the Hitsats refugee camp, Humera, Mai Kadra, the Mahbere Dego, and Zalambessa. Additionally, the ENDF and EDF were accused of genocide.
Between 100,000 and 600,000 people were killed, and war rape became a "daily" occurrence, with girls as young as 8 and women as old as 72 being raped, often in front of their families. A survey found that, over the course of the conflict, around 1 in 10 women in Tigray were subjected to sexual violence, 8 in 100 were subjected to rape, and 4 in 100 were subjected to gang rape.
Nails, screws, plastic rubbish and other foreign bodies were forced into reproductive organs of women, in what was seen as part of a wider effort to destroy fertility of women in Tigray. A major humanitarian crisis developed as a result of the war, which led to a widespread famine.
It also inflicted immense economic damage on the region, with the cost of rebuilding alone estimated to be roughly $20 billion. Large-scale fighting in the area resumed in the 2026 Ethiopian offensive, as TPLF forces declared a defensive war against Ethiopia. Tigrayan forces and Ethiopian federal forces clashed while Ethiopia accused Eritrea of supporting rebel groups.
The renewed fighting occurred amid deteriorating relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and unresolved regional tensions involving Sudan and Egypt.
Historical and political context
Following the end of the Ethiopian Civil War in 1991, Ethiopia became a dominant-party state under the rule of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four ethnically based parties. The founding and most influential member was the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), led by Meles Zenawi, who was the prime minister of Ethiopia until his death in 2012.
He was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the chairman of the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), a coalition member. On 15 February 2018, Hailemariam announced his resignation as both prime minister and chairman of the EPRDF, owing to a growing discontent within the public, fueled by a reaction to 27 years of repressive governance.
On 28 March 2018, in a closed-door election to chair the EPRDF, executive committee members elected the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organisation (OPDO) chairman Abiy Ahmed. On 2 April 2018, Ethiopian parliament elected Abiy as prime minister.
One of Abiy's first actions after his election was to initiate a warming of relations with Eritrea, a long-time rival of the TPLF, to end a 20-year long border conflict. While this decision was considered a cause of celebration at the time, many within the Tigray Region were heavily critical of this, seeing it as a betrayal of those who died in the 19981–2000 war.
The TPLF condemned the peace initiatives, saying they were hastily made, had "fundamental flaws", and also claimed it was decided on without consulting long-time TPLF members. On 1 December 2019, Abiy merged the ethnic and region-based parties of the EPRDF (which had governed Ethiopia for 28 years) and several opposition parties into his new Prosperity Party.
The TPLF, which had long dominated Ethiopian politics, refused to join this new party. After losing the election and being ousted from the federal government, TPLF officials relocated to the Tigray Region, continuing to administer control there while frequently clashing with the federal government.
In one instance, the Tigray regional government was reported to have defied the federal government and refused to allow Ethiopian Federal Police to arrest Getachew Assefa, the former chief of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of Ethiopia and executive member of the TPLF. The Ethiopian government and its supporters accused the TPLF of trying to re-establish their rule over the country through violence and force.
In turn, the TPLF accused the federal government of accumulating too much power for itself, and that it was engaging in ethnic discrimination of Tigrayans.
Constitutional context
The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia states in Article 39.1, "Every Nation, Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession." Article 62.9 grants the House of Federation the right to "order Federal intervention if any State [government], in violation of [the] Constitution, endangers the constitutional order."
Casualties and human rights violations
As of May 2023, the combined impact of wartime violence, famine and a lack of medical access had killed an estimated 162,000–378,000 people according to researchers from Ghent University, with other reported estimates reaching numbers as high as 600,000 killed. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded over 100,000 battle-related fatalities to the Tigray conflict in 2022 alone, primarily military but including some civilians.
A peer-reviewed study by researchers from the University of London calculated over 102,000 excess deaths in Tigray from November 2020 to mid-2022, of which 72% are from violence and the rest from lack of healthcare and famine. The African Union mediator, Olusegun Obasanjo, publicly stated that the war likely killed around 600,000 people.
All sides in the conflict have been accused of committing war crimes and violating international human rights law, with evidence of unlawful killings, torture and sexual violence being widely reported.
Humanitarian crisis
In February 2021, GOAL Ethiopia, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), MCMDO, MSF-Spain, and World Vision, found that nearly one in seven children in 16 woredas and town administrations across Tigray were acutely malnourished. While in Enderta, Abi Adi and Shire, GOAL and IRC reported that 16.6% of children screened had acute malnutrition with 3.5% suffering from severe acute malnutrition.
There was limited access to clean water due to hygiene and sanitation services largely being disrupted across Tigray. The Tigray Regional Water Bureau reported that out of 36 villages it assessed, only 4 had partially functioning water sources.
Along with that, an estimated 250 motorized water pumping systems have been out of order, and the status of 11,000 hand pumps in rural areas was unknown. Because of this, there was a heightened risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases and COVID-19. to protect themselves from COVID-19 (March 2021) According to the UN, in March 2021, out of more than 260 health centres in Tigray before the war, only 31 were fully functional, while 7 were partially functional.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), all of the functioning hospitals and health centres in Tigray had a lack of medical supplies, drugs, and equipment. UN partners reported continued looting of health facilities.
Only 16% of the health facilities had vaccination services and only 17% had maternal services (antenatal care, birth delivery, etc.). In late October 2022, it was revealed that the Tigray Region was running out of medical supplies, with the CEO of their largest hospital saying it was "doomed to collapse soon". WHO officials stated that childhood vaccination rates had plummeted from 90% (before the war) to under 10%.
Humanitarian aid
According to the United Nations (UN), some 2.3 million children have been cut off from desperately needed aid and humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the conflict, the Ethiopian federal government has strictly controlled access to the Tigray Region, and the UN has said it is frustrated that talks with the Ethiopian government had not yet secured adequate humanitarian access for "food, including ready-to-use therapeutic food for the treatment of child malnutrition, medicines, water, fuel, and other essentials that are running low" said UNICEF.
By 13 March 2021, the UN and its partners reached about 900,000 people with complete food baskets, and 700,000 people with clean water. Despite the progress made, many are still hard to reach due to ongoing fighting. About 4.5 million people of are still in need of aid and about 1 million of that are not in accessible areas due to ongoing fighting.
On 31 August 2021, USAID's mission director in Ethiopia, Sean Jones said: "We do have proof that several of our warehouses have been looted and completely emptied in the areas, particularly in Amhara, where TPLF soldiers have gone into, I do believe that the TPLF has been very opportunistic," in a televised interview with state broadcaster EBC in Addis Ababa. All parties to the conflict have been accused by USAID of looting aid shipments.
By the summer of 2022, the government blockade of essential services to Tigray was still in place, and the humanitarian situation remained severe, with roughly 13 million people being in need of food aid. According to the World Food Programme, while international aid had technically been allowed into the region during the 2022 ceasefire, in practice, very little aid was reaching the people that needed it most, largely due to fuel not being made available in these areas.
On 25 August (one day after the war resumed), the WFP accused the TPLF of stealing 570,000 liters of fuel meant to transport humanitarian aid. On 29 October the same year, UNICEF reported that around 29.7 million people in Ethiopia were in need of humanitarian assistance.
Internal and forced displacement
In December 2020, the UN estimated more than one million people had been internally displaced by the fighting. More than 50,000 people have fled to Sudan due to the conflict. Communications and travel links were still blocked, and Human Rights Watch warned that "actions that deliberately impede relief supplies" would violate international humanitarian law.
Possible COVID-19 outbreaks were feared as refugees fleeing the Tigray conflict sheltered in crowded camps. By March 2021, Shire had become a major centre for internally displaced people and humanitarian aid distribution.
In September 2021, the humanitarian situation continued to worsen in Tigray, Afar and Amhara Regions, due both to the armed conflict itself and due to bureaucratic obstruction. Two thousand displaced people returned to the Fantí Rasu zone in Afar Region after the ENDF and Afar Special Forces regained control and OCHA partner organisations' access to improved.
UNICEF stated that by the end of September 2022, around 574,000 more people in Afar, Amhara and Tigray were left displaced after fighting resumed in August 2022; they also reported that over 870,000 had become refugees.
Internet and media
Internationally the Tigray war received less coverage compared to other conflicts taking place at the time.
Role of online social networks
Claire Wilmot, writing in The Washington Post, found that a significant number of new, single-issue Twitter accounts were opened in the immediate aftermath of the Northern Command attacks. Most appeared to be authentic accounts from people seeking to raise international awareness of the conflict in the midst of a communications blackout in Tigray.
The Ethiopian government cited disinformation and hate speech to justify communications blackouts. Researchers suggested that reducing access to information could help to create contexts where misinformation can thrive because it reduces the ability to verify information.
In late July 2021, a report emerged that there was coordination in social media messaging and media reportage of the conflict in Ethiopia, to an extent it mirrored an earlier Syrian hybrid information campaign designated as Project Basma. The Ethiopian government tried to control the information environment by positioning itself as the sole provider of reliable information.
In February, pro-government groups called on their supporters in Ethiopia and the diaspora to combat what they called "TPLF fake news" online. Pro-government groups used tactics similar to those of pro-Tigray groups to push their narrative of the conflict, though as of 5 February, pro-government campaigns had produced fewer Tweets overall.
Both Agence France-Presse and BBC News have documented examples of old or manipulated photos, which misleadingly endorsed either the federal Ethiopian government or the TPLF. Researchers found that groups use tactics such as "copy and paste" campaigns hosted on websites, which include instructions for opening new accounts, copying and pasting pre-written tweets, and tagging influencers.
Both campaigns produced disinformation and misinformation, though the majority of content produced was activist in nature. Wilmot suggested that the lines between authentic political activity and deliberate manipulation of online content during the conflict were increasingly blurred.
Restriction of media coverage
The Ethiopian government had engaged in repeated crackdowns on media coverage throughout the war. In November 2021 (during the 2021–2022 state of emergency), the Ethiopian Media Authority (EMA) threatened to cancel the media licences of BBC News, Reuters, CNN and Associated Press, accusing the news organisations of having "consistently disseminated news that sowed seeds of animosity among people and compromised the sovereignty of the country."
The EMA cited "reporting the Law enforcement operation as a genocidal campaign" as an example of misleading information aiming to "undermin[e] the [federal] government's efforts to address the humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region." On 20 May 2022, Ethiopian law enforcement began arresting journalists en masse, with 4,500 people in the Amhara Region alone being taken into custody.
One Amhara law enforcement official described this as a way to maintain "law and order" and "get rid of outside enemies". The media restrictions resulted in what has been described as an "information blackout".
Many journalists, both local and international, have noted the difficulty they face in trying to report on the war, as they risk the possibility of getting either killed or imprisoned by government forces. By December 2021, the Committee to Protect Journalists described both Ethiopia and Eritrea as the worst "jailers of journalists" in sub-Saharan Africa.
Peace process
Several proposals for peace negotiations and mediation were made involving some of the main groups involved in the war. Of these, this includes: an emergency Intergovernmental Authority on Development summit in December 2020; a joint statement by the National Congress of Great Tigray, the Tigray Independence Party, and Salsay Weyane Tigray describing their eight pre-conditions for peace in February 2021; a mediation group called "A3+1", (consisting of three African countries, Kenya, Niger and Tunisia, and one non-African country, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) in July–August 2021; and a March–August 2022 ceasefire wherein Ethiopian and Tigrayan officials attempted to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict.
On 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leaders signed a peace accord, with the African Union as a mediator, and agreed on "orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament". The agreement was made effective the next day on 3 November, marking the second anniversary of the war.
As part of this process, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed TPLF's Getachew Reda as head of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray, and the Ethiopian parliament removed the TPLF from its terrorism list.
Reactions
The Tigray war has been the subject of numerous reactions and protests, both locally and worldwide. The Commission of Inquiry on Tigray Genocide was established by Tigrayan authorities in May 2022 to document the conflict. A report was released in October 20251, documenting their findings.
Fear for new renewed conflict
In late January 2026, clashes erupted in the Tigray region. Fighting involved Tigrayan forces and Ethiopian federal troops supported by Amhara militias in parts of western Tigray that Amhara forces had not withdrawn from despite the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. Diplomatic sources confirmed the clashes but said the situation on the ground remained unclear.
The TPLF said its central committee "has decided to reinstate the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which had been suspended in the name of peace". The statement accused the federal government of violating the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war, and of provoking armed conflict within the Tigray region.
It also accused the government of withholding funds to pay local civil servants.
See also
2020 in Eritrea 2020 in Ethiopia Eritrean–Ethiopian War Eritrean–Ethiopian border conflict Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991) List of civil wars Fano insurgency Ethiopian feminists facing digital gender-based violence
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378923368 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
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