Two-round system
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The two-round system (TRS or 2RS), sometimes called ballotage, top-two runoff, or two-round plurality, is a single-winner electoral system which aims to elect a member who has support of the majority of voters. The two-round system involves two rounds of choose-one voting, where the voter marks a single favorite candidate in each round. The two candidates with the most votes in the first round move on to a second election (a second round of voting). The two-round system is in the family of plurality voting systems that also includes single-round plurality (FPP). Like instant-runoff (ranked-choice) voting and first past the post, it elects one winner. The two-round system first emerged in France and has since become the most common single-winner electoral system worldwide. Despite this, runoff-based rules like the two-round system and RCV have faced criticism from social choice theorists as a result of their susceptibility to center squeeze (a kind of spoiler effect favoring extremists) and the no-show paradox. This has led to the rise of electoral reform movements (such as in France) which seek to replace the two-round system with other systems like rated voting. In the United States, the first round is often called a jungle or top-two primary.…
The two-round system (TRS or 2RS), sometimes called ballotage, top-two runoff, or two-round plurality, is a single-winner electoral system which aims to elect a member who has support of the majority of voters. The two-round system involves two rounds of choose-one voting, where the voter marks a single favorite candidate in each round. The two candidates with the most votes in the first round move on to a second election (a second round of voting). The two-round system is in the family of plurality voting systems that also includes single-round plurality (FPP). Like instant-runoff (ranked-choice) voting and first past the post, it elects one winner. The two-round system first emerged in France and has since become the most common single-winner electoral system worldwide. Despite this, runoff-based rules like the two-round system and RCV have faced criticism from social choice theorists as a result of their susceptibility to center squeeze (a kind of spoiler effect favoring extremists) and the no-show paradox. This has led to the rise of electoral reform movements (such as in France) which seek to replace the two-round system with other systems like rated voting. In the United States, the first round is often called a jungle or top-two primary. Georgia, Louisiana, California, and Washington use the two-round system for most or all non-presidential elections, while Alaska and Maine use a similar instant-runoff system. In other states, the partisan primary system that is often described as a de facto two-round system, with primaries narrowing down the field to two main candidates.
Partisan primaries
Partisan primaries which select candidates to the general election are a form of two-stage elections. The electoral system in the primary can differ by political party.
Approval voting with Runoff
The Approval with runoff is a two-round system which uses approval voting in the first round and the top two candidates proceed to a runoff in the second round. The approval voting reduces the center squeeze effect for multiple candidates in the first round.
Compliance with voting method criteria
Most of the mathematical criteria by which voting methods are compared were formulated for voters with ordinal preferences. Some methods, like approval voting, request information than cannot be unambiguously inferred from a single set of ordinal preferences. The two-round system is such a method, because the voters are not forced to vote according to a single ordinal preference in both rounds. If the voters determine their preferences before the election and always vote directly consistent to them, they will emulate the contingent vote and get the same results as if they were to use that method. Therefore, in that model of voting behavior, the two-round system passes all criteria that the contingent vote passes, and fails all criteria the contingent vote fails. Since the voters in the two-round system do not have to choose their second round votes while voting in the first round, they are able to adjust their votes as players in a game. More complex models consider voter behavior when the voters reach a game-theoretical equilibrium from which they have no incentive, as defined by their internal preferences, to further change their behavior. However, because these equilibria are complex, only partial results are known. With respect to the voters' internal preferences, the two-round system passes the majority criterion in this model, as a majority can always coordinate to elect their preferred candidate. Also, in the case of three candidates or less and a robust political equilibrium, the two-round system will pick the Condorcet winner whenever there is one, which is not the case in the contingent vote model. The equilibrium mentioned above is a perfect-information equilibrium and so only strictly holds in idealized conditions where every voter knows every other voter's preference. Thus it provides an upper bound on what can be achieved with rational (self-interested) coordination or knowledge of others' preferences. Since the voters almost surely will not have perfect information, it may not apply to real elections. In that matter, it is similar to the perfect competition model sometimes used in economics. To the extent that real elections approach this upper bound, large elections would do so less so than small ones, because it is less likely that a large electorate has information about all the other voters than that a small electorate has.
Tactical voting and strategic nomination
The two-round system is intended to reduce tactical voting. Under the single-winner plurality voting election system (also known as first past the post), Vote splitting can occur and the choice of just a minority of voters can be elected. Voters who favor less-popular candidates are encouraged to vote tactically, or "compromise", by voting for one of the two leading candidates, because a vote for any other candidate does not have as good a chance of affecting the result and also prevents the voter from indicating which of the two leading candidates they prefer. Under TRS if there are only three (viable) candidates, this is unnecessary: even if a voter's favorite candidate is eliminated in the first round, they will still have an opportunity to influence the result by voting for their second-favorite in the second round. However if there are more than three candidates, there is a reason for the voter to compromise and vote for a leading candidate in the first round, in order to avoid the chance that only candidates the voter dislikes advance to the second round and have chance to be elected. Under the two-round system, voters sometimes engage in "push over". A voter doing so votes for an unpopular "push over" candidate in the first round to ensure that it is this weak candidate, rather than a stronger rival, whom survives to challenge their preferred candidate in the second round. This can backfire if it removes too many votes for their preferred candidate, or the weak candidate's campaign may be energized by being advanced to the second round. The two-round system can be influenced by strategic nomination - this is where candidates and political factions influence the result of an election by nominating extra candidates or withdrawing a candidate who would otherwise have stood. TRS is vulnerable to strategic nomination for the same reasons that it is open to the voting tactic of compromising. This is because a candidate who knows they are unlikely to win can ensure that another candidate they support makes it to the second round by withdrawing from the race before the first round occurs, or by never choosing to stand in the first place. By reducing the size of its slate, a political faction can avoid the spoiler effect, whereby a party "splits the vote" of its supporters. A famous example of this spoiler effect occurred in the 2002 French presidential election, when so many left-wing candidates stood in the first round that all of them were eliminated, and two right-wing candidates advanced to the second round. Conversely, a popular faction may fund the campaign of multiple smaller opposing candidates, in order to split the opposition votes among them. The intention of two-round system is that the winning candidate will have the support of a majority of the votes cast. Under the first past the post method, the candidate with most votes (a plurality or a majority) wins, even if they do not have a majority (more than half) of votes. The two-round system tries to overcome this problem by permitting only two candidates in the second round, so that one must receive a majority of votes counted. Critics argue that the majority obtained by the winner under the two-round system is an artificial one. Instant-runoff voting and the exhaustive ballot are two other voting methods that create a majority for one candidate by eliminating weaker candidates and then transferring votes based on back-up preferences. However, in cases where there are three or more strong candidates, the TRS will sometimes produce a majority for a different winner than the candidate elected by a majority produced under instant-runoff voting or the exhaustive ballot. Advocates of Condorcet methods argue that a candidate can claim to have majority support only if they are the "Condorcet winner" – that is, the candidate whose vote tally is greater than that of every other candidate in a series of one-on-one comparisons. In the two-round system, in the last round, the winning candidate is only matched, one-on-one, with one of the other candidates. When a Condorcet winner exists, the candidate does not necessarily win a TRS election due to insufficient support in the first round. Two-round system advocates counter that the voter's first preference is more important than lower preferences because that is where voters are putting the most effort of decision and that, unlike Condorcet methods, to win under the TRS requires a good showing among the full field of candidates in the first round and also a plurality in the final head-to-head competition. Condorcet methods can allow candidates to win who have minimal first-choice support and can win largely on the compromise appeal of being ranked second or third by more voters.
Impact on factions and candidates
The two-round system encourages candidates to appeal to a broad cross-section of voters. This is because, in order to win an absolute majority in the second round, it is necessary for a candidate to win the support of voters whose favorite candidate has been eliminated. Under the two-round system, between rounds of voting, eliminated candidates, and the factions who previously supported them, often issue recommendations to their supporters as to whom to vote for in the second round of the contest. This means that eliminated candidates are still able to influence the result of the election. This influence leads to political bargaining between the two remaining candidates and the parties and candidates who have been eliminated, sometimes resulting in the two successful candidates making policy concessions to the less successful ones. Because it encourages conciliation and negotiation in these ways, the two-round system is advocated, in various forms, by some supporters of deliberative democracy. The two-round system is designed for single-seat constituencies. Therefore, like other single-seat methods, if used to elect a council or legislature it will not produce proportional representation (PR). This means that it is likely to lead to the representation of a small number of larger parties in an assembly, rather than a proliferation of small parties. In practice, the two-round system produces results very similar to those produced by the plurality method, and encourages a two-party system similar to those found in many countries that use plurality. Under a parliamentary system, it is more likely to produce single-party governments than are PR methods, which tend to produce coalition governments. While the two-round system is designed to ensure that each individual candidate elected is supported by a majority of voters in the constituency, it does not ensure majority rule on a national level when it comes to electing an assembly. As in other non-PR methods, the party or coalition that wins a majority of seats often will not have the support of a majority of voters across the nation.
Practical implications
In smaller elections, such as those in assemblies or private organizations, it is sometimes possible to conduct both rounds in quick succession. More commonly, however, large-scale public elections the two rounds of runoff voting are held on separate days, and so involve voters going to the polls twice and governments conducting two elections. As a result, one of the most common criticisms against the two-round system is that the cost and difficulty of casting a ballot is effectively doubled. However, the system may sometimes still be cheaper than holding a ranked-choice runoff (RCV), as the counting of votes in each round is simple. By contrast, ranked-choice runoff voting involves a longer and more complex count that often requires a centralized count, as it is impossible to tally or audit RCV results locally. The two-round voting system also has the potential to cause political instability between the two rounds of voting.
Other examples of use
Two-round voting is used in French departmental elections. In Italy, it is used to elect mayors, but also to decide which party or coalition receives a majority bonus in city councils. Historically it was used to elect the Reichstag in the German Empire between 1871 and 1918 and the Storting of Norway from 1905 to 1919, in New Zealand in the 1908 and 1911 elections, and in Israel to elect the Prime Minister in the 1996, 1999 and 2001 elections. El Salvador used a two-round system to elects its president until the 2024 presidential election; a constitutional reform in 2025 abolished the two-round system.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1373434127 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.