Uncertainty effect
The uncertainty effect, also known as direct risk aversion, is a phenomenon in economics and psychology in which individuals value a risky prospect (such as a lottery with known probabilities) less than its worst possible outcome.
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The uncertainty effect, also known as direct risk aversion, is a phenomenon in economics and psychology in which individuals value a risky prospect (such as a lottery with known probabilities) less than its worst possible outcome. In the original study by Uri Gneezy, John A. List, and George Wu in 2006, participants were willing to pay $38 for a $50 gift card, but only $28 for a lottery ticket that would yield either a $50 or $100 gift card with equal probability.
This effect is considered to be a violation of "internality" (i.e., the proposition that the value of a risky prospect must lie somewhere between the value of that prospect’s best and worst possible realizations) which is central to prospect theory, expected utility theory, and other models of risky choice. Additionally, it has been proposed as an explanation for a host of naturalistic behaviors which cannot be explained by dominant models of risky choice, such as the popularity of insurance/extended warranties for consumer products.
While expected utility theory and prospect theory differ in terms of how outcomes are evaluated and weighted, they both nonetheless rely upon what Gonzalez, List, and Wu term as the "internality axiom." This axiom specifically posits that the value of some risky prospect must lie between the value of that prospect's best and worst possible outcomes.
Formally, for some risky prospect L = (x, p, y) which offers p probability of earning x and 1-p probability of earning y (where x is strictly greater than y ), individuals' elicited values for x , y , and L should satisfy the following inequality: V(x) \geq V(L) \geq V(y) . In a series of studies conducted by Gneezy, List, and Wu, and in follow-up work conducted by Uri Simonsohn (among others), individuals were repeatedly shown to violate this assumption. For example: In an initial laboratory study which compared the willingness to pay (WTP) values for an even chance at winning a $50 giftcard or a $100 giftcard to the values of a $50 or $100 giftcard in isolation (all restricted for use at a local bookstore), individuals were – on average – willing to pay $26.10 for the $50 giftcard, $45.00 for the $100 giftcard, but only $16.12 for the lottery In follow-up laboratory studies with a modified elicitation format, and which also compared items with different use cases (e.g., a $100 giftcard for use at a restaurant versus a $50 giftcard for use at a bookstore; a voucher which yielded a free meal for four at a restaurant versus a $50 giftcard for use at a bookstore; etc.), individuals ascribed lower WTP values to a lottery that yielded one of two positive outcomes with equal probability than they did to the relevant positive outcomes in isolation In a field study with experienced baseball card traders, individuals were willing to pay significantly less for a lottery that yielded either a low-value card or a high-value card with equal probability ($34.09) than they were for the low-value card ($52.72) or the high-value card ($65.02) in isolation Within this body of work, the uncertainty effect was also shown to extend to choice and to consideration of delayed outcomes; it was also shown not to be a consequence of poorly comprehending the lottery.
Among other explanations, it has been proposed that the uncertainty effect might arise as a consequence of individuals experiencing some form of disutility from risk.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1310292076 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.