UTA Flight 141
UTA Flight 141 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Guinean regional airline Union des Transports Africains de Guinée (UTA), flying from Conakry to Dubai with stopovers in Benin, Libya and Lebanon.
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UTA Flight 141 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Guinean regional airline Union des Transports Africains de Guinée (UTA), flying from Conakry to Dubai with stopovers in Benin, Libya and Lebanon. On Christmas Day 2003, the Boeing 727–223 operating the flight struck a building and crashed into the Bight of Benin while rolling for take off from Cotonou, killing 141 people.
The crash of Flight 141 is the deadliest crash in Benin's aviation history. The investigation concluded that the crash was primarily caused by overloading. However, it also subsequently revealed massive incompetence within the airline, particularly on its dangerous safety culture.
The issue had gone unnoticed following lapses between authorities and further incompetence in management oversight led to the aircraft's overloaded state. Multiple factors, including the short runway at Cotonou and the high demand of passengers for the route, had also contributed to the crash.
In regards to the result of the investigation, the Guinean government was urged to create reforms and regulations on the civil aviation authorities in the country.…
UTA Flight 141 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Guinean regional airline Union des Transports Africains de Guinée (UTA), flying from Conakry to Dubai with stopovers in Benin, Libya and Lebanon. On Christmas Day 2003, the Boeing 727–223 operating the flight struck a building and crashed into the Bight of Benin while rolling for take off from Cotonou, killing 141 people.
The crash of Flight 141 is the deadliest crash in Benin's aviation history. The investigation concluded that the crash was primarily caused by overloading. However, it also subsequently revealed massive incompetence within the airline, particularly on its dangerous safety culture.
The issue had gone unnoticed following lapses between authorities and further incompetence in management oversight led to the aircraft's overloaded state. Multiple factors, including the short runway at Cotonou and the high demand of passengers for the route, had also contributed to the crash.
In regards to the result of the investigation, the Guinean government was urged to create reforms and regulations on the civil aviation authorities in the country. The BEA, the commission responsible for the investigation, had also urged ICAO to examine provisions related to safety oversight and the FAA and the European EASA were asked to support the creation of an autonomous weight and balance calculation system on board every airliner.
Flight
Flight 141 was a chartered passenger flight from the Guinean capital of Conakry, Benin's largest city of Cotonou and the Lebanese capital of Beirut with the final destination in Dubai. A stopover was included in the flight plan with the Libyan town of Kufra as a refueling stop. It was a weekly scheduled flight with one round trip flight per week.
The aircraft had been chartered by 2 Lebanese men. Many of those on board were Lebanese diaspora who had been living in multiple West African countries for years. As it was Christmas Day, many of those on board were travelling home to spend the holidays with families.
Dozens of passengers could be seen carrying hand baggage filled with Christmas gifts. The situation was chaotic as the check-in staff at the airport had not allocated seats for the passengers. A boarding pass was also not needed at the airport.
Passengers could sell their respective seats at last-minute to someone else who were not booked on the flight as their names were not written on the boarding pass. The aircraft was full with passengers. A total of 86 people had boarded the aircraft in Conakry and 9 people had disembarked in Cotonou.
The aircraft had also received another 10 passengers from an aircraft that had flown from Togo. The boarding was disorderly. Many passengers tried to sit beside their friends and even occupied the cabin jump seats and the cabin crew were overwhelmed.
Meanwhile, the flight crew were involved in an argument inside the cockpit as they had not received the basic information on the aircraft's load. While the cockpit crew were engaged in an argument on the weight and balance, the ground baggage handler was loading the baggage at the aft of the aircraft.
One of UTA's agents then asked the handler to load the baggage at the forward hold, which was already filled with baggage. Subsequently, the forward hold was full with baggage. Back in the cockpit, the crew continued to discuss the weight of the baggage.
They became more frustrated as there were no information regarding the number of passengers that had boarded the aircraft in Cotonou. It was a tense situation as all the flight crew were unable to determine the exact weight of the baggage of each passengers.
As the Captain decided to discuss the matter with the flight engineer, the First Officer became angry and yelled at the Director General of UTA, who was sitting at the cockpit jump seat across him, due to the absence of information. The UTA executive, however, tried to reason with the First Officer on the matter. The UTA executive immediately apologized to the crew.
He stated that he would tell the management off as soon as the aircraft arrived in Beirut, later added that he would send messages to not allow anymore baggage or luggage weighing more than 30 kilograms. By this time, all passengers had already boarded the aircraft. Fuel was added to both tanks and the flight plan had been filed by the captain.
The Captain then configured the aircraft with flaps at 25 degrees. The elevator was set at 6 and full power with brakes on would be applied for the take-off, followed by a three-degree maximum for take-off climb. The First Officer was the pilot flying.
The air conditioner was shut down. The weather was hot and dry. Weather report stated that there were cirrus clouds covering the sky and that there were some stratocumulus at an altitude of .
The visibility was about and the humidity was at 75%. As everything was set, the crew began the take-off roll. However, several passengers were still reluctant to sit down and decided to stand near their friends.
This led the chief flight attendant to inform the cockpit crew on the situation. Order was finally restored after the Directorate General of UTA had called for order and the passengers finally decided to sit down on the floor. At 13:58 local time, the flight crew applied take-off thrust.
A few seconds later, the brakes were released. The First Officer was pushing the nose down and the captain was observing the airspeed. The aircraft then reached V 1 and subsequently reached its V R speed.
An input from 5-degree nose down to 10-degree nose up was made by the First Officer in a span of two seconds. The nose of the aircraft, however, remained constant and the speed continued to increase. The Captain became anxious as the aircraft's wheel had not lifted off the runway.
He then called for rotation at least twice. The First Officer then pulled the yoke even harder so the aircraft could take-off. The angle of attack then changed from −1.2-degree to a maximum of +9-degree, at a speed of 1 degree per second.
The aircraft finally managed to lift off at 13:59:07 for a negligible altitude. Realizing that they were going to run out of runway, the captain urged the first officer to pull harder. At 13:59:11, the aircraft struck the localizer antennas at the end of the runway.
The aircraft's main landing gears then impacted the localizer building, causing the roof to fly for approximately 9 meters from the point of impact. The right main landing gear then detached. The impact subsequently caused small parts of the tail and the aircraft's stair to detach as well.
The aircraft then impacted the airport's concrete boundary fence, scraping the lower part of the fuselage and caused some parts of the flaps to separate from the wings. The aircraft then slid and struck a rainwater drainage canal located right after the perimeter fence. The collision damaged the aircraft's landing gears and parts of its wings.
The leading edge and the outer aileron from the right wing then separated from the airframe. A survivor who was seated at the rear of the aircraft stated that people flew off their seats and, at the moment of impact, "fly around the cabin". According to testimonies, some passengers had not attached their seatbelts.
After it had struck the drainage canal, the aircraft broke up into three parts; the cockpit section, the fuselage, and the tail of the aircraft, all of which ended up in the sea. The majority of the fuselage managed to stay intact however, the fuselage became upside down due to the impact, drowning the occupants inside.
Those who were seated near the breaks were able to get out of the sinking wreckage.
Passengers and crews
According to Lebanese Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, 122 of those on board were Lebanese-French nationals. There were also people from Togo, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Sierra Leone, Palestine, Peru, Syria, Nigeria, and also a youth wrestler from Iran. Among the passengers were 15 Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers returning from their duties in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
A congressional report from the United States Senate indicated that there were officials related to Hezbollah's West Africa operation on board Flight 141. The manifest indicated that a total of 86 people, including 4 children and 3 babies, boarded the aircraft while it was in Conakry.
Among the 86 passengers were 45 passengers from Sierra Leone, including the Bangladeshi peacekeepers who had boarded without transit checks. In Cotonou, a total of 9 passengers disembarked from the aircraft and 63 people, including 3 children and 2 babies, boarded the aircraft.
The aircraft also received 10 passengers, including a child and a baby, from a transit flight that had originated from Togo. Based on the written manifest, the total number of passengers were 150, consisted of 138 adults, 8 children and 6 babies.
The exact number of passengers on board, however, were impossible to determine, as more passengers were thought to be aboard than were listed on the manifest. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was configured with 12 first-class seats, 138 economy seats, and 6 seats for flight attendants. There were five seats in the cockpit and 4 jump seats for the cabin crew.
All three flight crew members had previously flown for Libyan Arab Airlines, and had their first flight with the airline on 8 December 2003. All of the crew members were provided by Financial Advisory Group (FAG) as the owner of the aircraft. The captain was 49-year-old Najib al-Barouni with 11,000 flight hours, including 8,000 hours on the Boeing 727.
His commercial pilot license was issued by the United Kingdom in 1977. He later obtained the Boeing 727 flying license in 1988 and joined FAG in March 2003. Prior to his work with UTA, he had flown for Royal Jordanian Airlines for 3 months and Trans Air Benin for 6 months.
The first officer was 49-year-old Ahmad al-Harizi, whose flight information was not stated in the accident report. He had obtained his commercial pilot license in 1979, issued by the United Kingdom. The 45-year-old flight engineer, identified only as Miftah, had 14,000 flight hours, all on the Boeing 727.
There were 7 other crew members on board the aircraft, consisted of four flight attendants, two Peruvian ground mechanics and one transporter. There were also two UTA executives, including the Director General of UTA, aboard the aircraft. They were both seated at the cabin crew jump seats.
Investigation
The crash was the deadliest civil airliner crash in the history of Benin. It was also the first major aircraft accident in the country. Thus, the country did not have the experience to investigate the crash.
While the government had set up a special commission to investigate the cause of the crash, the government requested the French BEA to carry out the probe. The investigation also invited representatives from Boeing and the FAA. According to the final report, the investigation team faced great difficulties during their attempts to obtain adequate data and documentations from UTA.
The team had to rely to direct testimonies from the surviving crew members, reasoning, and calculations made from the available recorded parameters.
Aftermath
In response to the crash, the government of Benin declared three-days of national mourning. The then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed his condolences to the relatives of the crash, particularly to the families of the 15 UN peacekeepers. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) later sent 11 members1 of a coordination team to Cotonou for the repatriation.
On 28 December, a repatriation ceremony was held in Cotonou for 77 Lebanese victims and 2 Iranians. A French military aircraft had been ordered to carry the coffins to Beirut.
The aircraft arrived in Beirut on the next day and another repatriation ceremony was held, attended by Lebanese President Émile Lahoud, Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Speaker of the House Nabih Berri and Muslim clerics. The crash of Flight 141 revealed another source of influx of cash for Hezbollah, a prominent Lebanese Shiite militant group, from countries in West Africa.
Among the passengers was a Hezbollah official carrying US$2 million that had been raised by supporters of Hezbollah in West Africa. A report made by United States Congress revealed a vast network of wealthy Lebanese nationals in multiple West African countries who had supported Hezbollah campaigns and provided funds to the organization.
The report further accused Hezbollah of blood diamond trade and other illicit activities with local drug traffickers in the region, which was already known for its notorious drug trafficking alliances. In October 2010, a Lebanese court sentenced the captain of the flight, Najib al-Barouni, to 20 years in prison after being found guilty of neglect.
The court also sentenced Imad Saba, a Palestinian-American owner of the aircraft, UTA general manager Ahmed Khazem and UTA operations chief Mohammed Khazem to prison with serving time ranging from 3 months to 3 years. All of them were ordered to provide compensations with a total of US$930,000 to the relatives of the victims.
See also
Arrow Air Flight 1285R Air Midwest Flight 5481
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1374887016 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
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