Value at risk
Value at risk (VaR) is a measure of the risk of loss of investment/capital.
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Value at risk (VaR) is a measure of the risk of loss of investment/capital. It estimates how much a set of investments might lose (with a given probability), given normal market conditions, in a set time period such as a day. VaR is typically used by firms and regulators in the financial industry to gauge the amount of assets needed to cover possible losses.
VaR has four main uses in finance: risk management, financial control, financial reporting and computing regulatory capital. VaR is sometimes used in non-financial applications as well. However, it is a controversial risk management tool.
Important related ideas are economic capital, backtesting, stress testing, expected shortfall, and tail conditional expectation.
Definition
For a given portfolio, time horizon, and probability p, the p VaR can be defined informally as the maximum possible loss during that time after excluding all worse outcomes whose combined probability is at most p. This assumes mark-to-market pricing, and no trading in the portfolio. See also below.
For example, if a portfolio of stocks has a one-day 5% VaR of $1 million, that means that there is a 0.05 probability that the portfolio will fall in value by $1 million or more over a one-day period if there is no trading. Informally, a loss of $1 million or more on this portfolio is expected on 1 day out of 20 days (because of 5% probability).
More formally, p VaR is defined such that the probability of a loss greater than VaR is (at most) p while the probability of a loss less than VaR is (at least) 1-p. A loss which exceeds the VaR threshold is termed a "VaR breach". For a fixed p, the p VaR does not assess the magnitude of loss when a VaR breach occurs and therefore is considered by some to be a questionable metric for risk management.
For instance, assume someone makes a bet that flipping a coin seven times will not give seven heads. The terms are that he wins $100 if this does not happen (with probability 127/128) and he loses $12,700 if it does happen (with probability 1/128). That is, the possible loss amounts are $0 or $12,700.
The 1% VaR is then $0, because the probability of any loss at all is 1/128 which is less than 1%. They are, however, exposed to a possible loss of $12,700 which can be expressed as the p VaR for any p ≤ 0.78125% (1/128). Let X be a random variable representing profit and loss, with losses negative and profits positive.
The VaR at level \alpha\in(0,1) is the smallest number y such that the probability that Y:=-X does not exceed y is at least 1-\alpha . Mathematically, \operatorname{VaR}_{\alpha}(X) is the (1-\alpha) -quantile of Y , i.e., \operatorname{VaR}_\alpha(X)=-\inf\big\{x\in\mathbb{R}:F_X(x)>\alpha\big\} = F^{-1}_Y(1-\alpha).
This is the most general definition of VaR and the two identities are equivalent (indeed, for any real random variable X its cumulative distribution function F_X is well defined). This definition does not by itself specify how the distribution of X is estimated; VaR may be estimated parametrically or nonparametrically.
Risk managers typically assume that some fraction of the bad events will have undefined losses, either because markets are closed or illiquid, or because the entity bearing the loss breaks apart or loses the ability to compute accounts. Therefore, they do not accept results based on the assumption of a well-defined probability distribution.
Nassim Taleb has labeled this assumption, "charlatanism". On the other hand, many academics prefer to assume a well-defined distribution, albeit usually one with fat tails. This point has probably caused more contention among VaR theorists than any other.
Value at risk can also be written as a distortion risk measure given by the distortion function g(x) = \begin{cases}0 & \text{if }0 \leq x New York Times reporter Joe Nocera wrote an extensive piece Risk Mismanagement on January 4, 2009, discussing the role VaR played in the 2008 financial crisis. After interviewing risk managers (including several of the ones cited above) the article suggests that VaR was very useful to risk experts, but nevertheless exacerbated the crisis by giving false security to bank executives and regulators.
A powerful tool for professional risk managers, VaR is portrayed as both easy to misunderstand, and dangerous when misunderstood. Taleb in 2009 testified in Congress asking for the banning of VaR for a number of reasons. One was that tail risks are non-measurable.
Another was that for anchoring reasons VaR leads to higher risk taking. VaR is not subadditive: VaR of a combined portfolio can be larger than the sum of the VaRs of its components. For example, the average bank branch in the United States is robbed about once every ten years.
A single-branch bank has about 0.0004% chance of being robbed on a specific day, so the risk of robbery would not figure into one-day 1% VaR. It would not even be within an order of magnitude of that, so it is in the range where the institution should not worry about it, it should insure against it and take advice from insurers on precautions.
The whole point of insurance is to aggregate risks that are beyond individual VaR limits, and bring them into a large enough portfolio to get statistical predictability. It does not pay for a one-branch bank to have a security expert on staff. As institutions get more branches, the risk of a robbery on a specific day rises to within an order of magnitude of VaR.
At that point it makes sense for the institution to run internal stress tests and analyze the risk itself. It will spend less on insurance and more on in-house expertise. For a very large banking institution, robberies are a routine daily occurrence.
Losses are part of the daily VaR calculation, and tracked statistically rather than case-by-case. A sizable in-house security department is in charge of prevention and control, the general risk manager just tracks the loss like any other cost of doing business.
As portfolios or institutions get larger, specific risks change from low-probability/low-predictability/high-impact to statistically predictable losses of low individual impact. That means they move from the range of far outside VaR, to be insured, to near outside VaR, to be analyzed case-by-case, to inside VaR, to be treated statistically. VaR is a static measure of risk.
By definition, VaR is a particular characteristic of the probability distribution of the underlying (namely, VaR is essentially a quantile). For a dynamic measure of risk, see Novak, ch. 10. There are common abuses of VaR: Assuming that plausible losses will be less than some multiple (often three) of VaR.
Losses can be extremely large. Reporting a VaR that has not passed a backtest. Regardless of how VaR is computed, it should have produced the correct number of breaks (within sampling error) in the past.
A common violation of common sense is to estimate a VaR based on the unverified assumption that everything follows a multivariate normal distribution.
VaR, CVaR, RVaR and EVaR
VaR is not a coherent risk measure in general, because it can violate the subadditivity property: \mathrm{If}\; X,Y \in \mathbf{L} ,\; \mathrm{then}\; \rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y). However, it can be bounded by coherent risk measures like Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) or entropic value at risk (EVaR). CVaR is defined by average of VaR values for confidence levels between 0 and .
However VaR, unlike CVaR, has the property of being a robust statistic. A related class of risk measures is the 'Range Value at Risk' (RVaR), which is a robust version of CVaR.
For X\in \mathbf{L}_{M^+} (with \mathbf{L}_{M^+} the set of all Borel measurable functions whose moment-generating function exists for all positive real values) we have \text{VaR}_{1-\alpha}(X)\leq \text{RVaR}_{\alpha,\beta}(X) \leq \text{CVaR}_{1-\alpha}(X)\leq\text{EVaR}_{1-\alpha}(X), where \begin{align} &\text{VaR}_{1-\alpha}(X):=\inf_{t\in\mathbf{R}}\{t:\text{Pr}(X\leq t)\geq 1-\alpha\},\\ &\text{CVaR}_{1-\alpha}(X) := \frac{1}{\alpha}\int_0^{\alpha} \text{VaR}_{1-\gamma}(X)d\gamma,\\ &\text{RVaR}_{\alpha,\beta}(X) := \frac{1}{\beta-\alpha}\int_{\alpha}^{\beta} \text{VaR}_{1-\gamma}(X)d\gamma,\\ &\text{EVaR}_{1-\alpha}(X):=\inf_{z>0}\{z^{-1}\ln(M_X(z)/\alpha)\}, \end{align} in which M_X(z) is the moment-generating function of at . In the above equations the variable denotes the financial loss, rather than wealth as is typically the case.
Risk Mismanagement, Joe Nocera NY Times article. "VaR Doesn't Have To Be Hard", Rich Tanenbaum "Coherent measures of Risk", Philippe Artzner, Freddy Delbaen, Jean-Marc Eber, and David Heath Tools "The Pricing and Trading of Interest Rate Derivatives", J H M Darbyshire, MSc.
Online real-time VaR calculator, Razvan Pascalau, University of Alabama Value-at-Risk (VaR), Simon Benninga and Zvi Wiener. (Mathematica in Education and Research Vol. 7 No. 4 1998.) Derivatives Strategy Magazine.
"Inside D. E. Shaw" Trading and Risk Management 1998 Simulate Historical Value at Risk Online Calculator
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