{
  "id": "enwiki-001315486815",
  "slug": "virtual-valuation",
  "title": "Virtual valuation",
  "qid": "",
  "lead": "In auction theory, particularly Bayesian-optimal mechanism design, a virtual valuation of an agent is a function that measures the surplus that can be extracted from that agent. A typical application is a seller who wants to sell an item to a potential buyer and wants to decide on the optimal price. The optimal price depends on the valuation of the buyer to the item, v . The seller does not know v exactly, but he assumes that v is a random variable, with some cumulative distribution function F(v) and probability distribution function f(v) := F'(v) . The virtual valuation of the agent is defined as: :: r(v) := v - \\frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)}",
  "body": "In auction theory, particularly Bayesian-optimal mechanism design, a virtual valuation of an agent is a function that measures the surplus that can be extracted from that agent. A typical application is a seller who wants to sell an item to a potential buyer and wants to decide on the optimal price. The optimal price depends on the valuation of the buyer to the item, v . The seller does not know v exactly, but he assumes that v is a random variable, with some cumulative distribution function F(v) and probability distribution function f(v) := F'(v) . The virtual valuation of the agent is defined as: r(v) := v - \\frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)} r(p) = 0 This guarantees that the buyer will buy the item, if and only if his virtual-valuation is weakly-positive, so the seller will have a weakly-positive expected profit. This exactly equals the optimal sale price – the price that maximizes the expected value of the seller's profit, given the distribution of valuations: p = \\operatorname{argmax}_v v\\cdot (1-F(v)) Virtual valuations can be used to construct Bayesian-optimal mechanisms also when there are multiple buyers, or different item-types. F(v) = v \\text{ in } [0,1] f(v) = 1 \\text{ in } [0,1] r(v) = 2v-1 \\text{ in } [0,1] r^{-1}(0) = 1/2 , so the optimal single-item price is&nbsp;1/2. 2. The buyer's valuation has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. w(v) is monotonically increasing, and crosses the x-axis in about 0.75, so this is the optimal price. The crossing point moves right when the standard deviation is larger. r(v) := \\frac{f(v)}{1-F(v)} Monotone-hazard-rate implies regularity, but the opposite is not true. The proof is simple: the monotone hazard rate implies -\\frac{1}{r(v)} is weakly increasing in v and therefore the virtual valuation v-\\frac{1}{r(v)} is strictly increasing in v .",
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  "license": "CC BY-SA 4.0",
  "source_uri": "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1315486815",
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  "claims": [],
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    "id": "enwiki-001315486815",
    "type": "webpage",
    "title": "Virtual valuation",
    "author": [
      {
        "family": "Anticloud FZ LLE",
        "literal": "Anticloud FZ LLE"
      }
    ],
    "container-title": "encyclopegia.org",
    "publisher": "Anticloud FZ LLE",
    "publisher-place": "Dubai, United Arab Emirates",
    "URL": "https://encyclopegia.org/a/virtual-valuation",
    "issued": {
      "date-parts": [
        [
          2026,
          11,
          21
        ]
      ]
    },
    "accessed": {
      "date-parts": [
        [
          2026,
          11,
          21
        ]
      ]
    },
    "license": "CC BY-SA 4.0",
    "DOI": "eo1:enwiki-001315486815",
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