War Plan Orange

War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) was a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Imperial Japan in the years between the First and Second World Wars.

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War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) was a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Imperial Japan in the years between the First and Second World Wars. It failed to foresee the significance of technological changes in naval warfare, including the submarine, air support and aircraft carriers, and although the Battle of Midway was important, and the US Navy did "island-hop" to regain lost territory, there was no culminating "showdown" battle as anticipated by Plan Orange.

Development

, circa 1911.|alt=A portrait of United States Navy Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers in a naval uniform Informal studies as early as 1906 covered a number of possibilities, from basing at Gibraltar or Singapore, an idea revived by the British before World War II, to "a quick trans-Atlantic dash" to the Pacific. The plan eventually adopted was conceived by Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers in 1911.

19 Dec 1919: Strategy of the Pacific (JB 325, Serial 28) 7 Jul 1923: Estimate of the Situation, Orange (JB 325, Serial 207) 15 Aug 1924: Joint Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 228) 10 Jan 1929: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (JB 325, Serial 280) 20 Jun 1934: Inadequacy of Present Military and Naval Forces Philippine Area to Carry Out Assigned Missions in Event of an ORANGE War (JB 325, Serial 533) 8 May 1935: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 546) 19 May 1935: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 570) 14 Oct 1936: Revision of Joint Orange Estimate of the Situation (JB 325, Serial 589) 9 Dec 1936: Changes in Joint Basic War Plan Orange (JB 325, Serial 594) 19 Feb 1938: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (1938) (JB 325, Serials 617 & 618) The plan was formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange assumed that the United States would fight Japan alone.

Strategy

As originally conceived, it anticipated a blockade of the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the western Pacific. They were expected to hold out on their own, while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California and Hawaii and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal.

After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the fleet would sail to the western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail north for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet, and then blockade the Japanese home islands.

The strategy was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets, as they had been for over 300 years. Following the 1933 Operations IV Wargame, which resulted in defeat for a hypothetical blue fleet meant to symbolize a US Philippine relief force, War Plan Orange was revised to account for a more steady, methodical advance in order to take Japanese strongpoints in the Marshall Islands.

This was done in accordance to observations that both stretched logistical capacity in the "through ticket to the Philippines" strategy, and inability to repair damaged vessels, allowed Japan to gain command of the sea via the neutralization of the US battle line force. Despite this, the strategy followed by the U.S. in the Pacific War differed little from Rodgers' concept from 1911: a leapfrog campaign to conquer the Marshalls and Carolines (held by Japan before the war), liberation of the Philippines, and blockade.

Absent was the "decisive battle" of Mahan, and of Japanese planning.

Japanese plans

In accordance with the Kantai Kessen naval strategy, the Imperial Japanese Navy developed its own plan, that allowed the US Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while the IJN would use submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a fleet action against the weakened US fleet in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, also in line with Mahanian doctrine, which Japan had enthusiastically embraced.

It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", taking into account that the US had naval commitments in other theaters, while Japan did not. It was also the basis of the United States' insistence on 60%, which amounted to parity.

Further reading

pt:Plano de guerra vermelho#Plano de guerra conjunto vermelho-laranja

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