Warlord

, one of many warlords in early 20th-century China Warlords are individuals who exercise military, economic, and political control over a region, often one without a strong central or national government, typically through informal control…

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, one of many warlords in early 20th-century China Warlords are individuals who exercise military, economic, and political control over a region, often one without a strong central or national government, typically through informal control over local armed forces. Warlords have existed throughout much of history, albeit in a variety of different capacities within the political, economic, and social structure of states or ungoverned territories.

The term is often applied in the context of China around the end of the Qing dynasty, especially during the Warlord Era. The term may also be used for a supreme military leader.

Philippines

As political scientist Dr. Ariel Hernandez documented, one example is the Philippines, where successive presidential administrations—at least since Ferdinand Marcos secured power in 1965—have "franchised violence to regional warlords" to counter the inroads of communist insurgents, Islamic rebels and organized criminal gangs. This has led to the formation of at least 93 "Partisan Armed Groups", armed militias loyal to regional warlords who, in exchange for their loyalty and willingness to use their private armies to quell the threats from these opposition groups, are granted a degree of autonomy within designated regions, the exclusive right to use violence and the right "to profit from the 'economy of violence' that they establish in their own areas".

Afghanistan

Warlordism in Afghanistan—another state where the central government is unable to extend political, military or bureaucratic control over large swaths of territories outside the capital—functions cooperatively within the framework of the state, at times. The warlords, with their established militias, are able to maintain a monopoly of violence within certain territories.

They form coalitions with competing warlords and local tribal leaders to present the central government with a challenge, and often the state will bargain to gain access to resources or "rent", loyalty from the warlord and peace in the region. In exchange for peaceful coexistence, the warlord coalitions are granted special status and privileges, including the right to maintain de facto political rule within the agreed-upon territory, exert force to retain their monopoly over violence and extract rent and resources.

"By limiting access to these privileges, members of the dominant warlord coalition create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves." In the case of Afghanistan, state–warlord bargaining sometimes extends beyond these informal accords and elevates to the status of political clientelism, in which the warlords are appointed to formal government positions, such as regional governor; a title which provides them political legitimacy.

During the state–warlord bargaining phase, warlords in Afghanistan have a high motivation to prolong war to create political instability, expose weakness of the central state, prompt regional criticism against the government and continue economic extraction.

Post-Soviet republics

In his study of warlordism in Georgia and Tajikistan, political scientist Jesse Driscoll emphasizes how the collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the rise of militant, independence-seeking nationalist movements within the republics—particularly within the Central Asian and Caucasus regions—resulting in armed conflict and civil war. Many strongmen warlords had served in the Soviet military, police units or intelligence services and had experience operating within highly organized bureaucracies.

These warlords formed well-structured militias that not only established political and economic control over territories, but institutionalized bureaucracies to establish and maintain their monopolies over violence and rent and "incentivizing the behavior of citizens within a particular geographical space". Driscoll termed this warlordism "militia coalition politics".

A truce was reached without any disarmament of militias; instead, the warlord coalitions reached a non-violent "order producing equilibrium", and eventually agreed upon a warlord-friendly civilian figurehead to assume head-of-state duties to demonstrate the legitimacy as a sovereign state to the rest of the world. This opened up Georgia and Tajikistan as states eligible to receive international aid, which thereafter became a major source of "rent" for the warlords, providing them with resources to increase their power and influence over these societies.

As Driscoll observed, the "warlords colluded to create a state".

Further reading

Ahram, Ariel I., and Charles King. "The warlord as arbitrageur." Theory and Society 41.2 (2012): 169-186 online .

Clubb, O. Edmund. 20th century China (1965) online pp 67–76, 108–145. Driscoll, Jesse.

Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Lezhnev, Sasha. Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States.

Plymouth 2005, . Marten, Kimberly. "Warlordism in comparative perspective."

International Security 31.3 (2007): 41-73 online. Marten, Kimberly. Warlords: Strong Arm Brokers in Weak States (Cornell UP, 2012).

Reno, William. Warlord politics and African states (Lynne Rienner, 1999), influential survey' online review. Reno, William.

"Mafiya troubles, warlord crises." in Beyond state crisis (2002): 105-28. Reno, William. "Illicit markets, violence, warlords, and governance: West African cases."

Crime, law and social change 52.3 (2009): 313-322. online Rich, Paul B. ed. Warlords in International Relations (1999). Sanborn, Joshua. "The genesis of Russian warlordism: Violence and governance during the First World War and the Civil War."

Contemporary European History (2010): 195-213 online. Skaperdas, Stergios. "Warlord Competition".

Journal of Peace Research (2002) 39 (4): 435–446. doi:10.1177/0022343302039004004 Waldron, Arthur. "The warlord: Twentieth-century Chinese understandings of violence, militarism, and imperialism." American Historical Review (1991): 1073-1100. online

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