Xiagang

1995 term for Chinese labour reforms

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Names in other languages

  • EnglishXiagang
  • 日本語下崗
  • 한국어하강
  • 中文下岗

Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.

Xiagang ( ) was a form of layoff associated with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China, particularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s when the country was experiencing intense economic transition from command economy to a market-oriented economy characterized by radical privatization and marketization. Unlike conventional unemployment, xiagang workers remain de jure employed by their former danweis (单位: work units) despite no longer working, generally receiving reduced wages or minimal benefits while seeking new employment.

The term was officially adopted by the government of China in the 1990s and initially applied primarily to workers from merged, bankrupted or downsized SOEs; its usage subsequently broadened to also encompass workers awaiting reassignment or experiencing suspended or reduced wages. Large-scale xiagang accompanied the acceleration of SOE restructuring during the premiership of Zhu Rongji, as China sought to curb losses and surplus employment in the state sector and develop a more robust private sector.

More than a quarter of China's SOE workforce was laid off within several years, with over 24.4 million workers recorded as xiagang by the end of 1999. Layoffs were unevenly distributed, with older industrial regions, particularly the once-prosperous Northeast and North China, among the areas most heavily affected.…

Xiagang ( ) was a form of layoff associated with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China, particularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s when the country was experiencing intense economic transition from command economy to a market-oriented economy characterized by radical privatization and marketization. Unlike conventional unemployment, xiagang workers remain de jure employed by their former danweis (单位: work units) despite no longer working, generally receiving reduced wages or minimal benefits while seeking new employment.

The term was officially adopted by the government of China in the 1990s and initially applied primarily to workers from merged, bankrupted or downsized SOEs; its usage subsequently broadened to also encompass workers awaiting reassignment or experiencing suspended or reduced wages. Large-scale xiagang accompanied the acceleration of SOE restructuring during the premiership of Zhu Rongji, as China sought to curb losses and surplus employment in the state sector and develop a more robust private sector.

More than a quarter of China's SOE workforce was laid off within several years, with over 24.4 million workers recorded as xiagang by the end of 1999. Layoffs were unevenly distributed, with older industrial regions, particularly the once-prosperous Northeast and North China, among the areas most heavily affected.

Xiagang represented a major transformation of China's employment and welfare system. Studies have associated the sudden increase of unemployed and underemployed labor force in the wake of xiagang with widening economic inequality between the Southern coastal provinces and the inland provinces, out-migration of skilled workers from declining industrial areas to the more economically developed first- and second-tier cities, and the expansion of informal employment, including unregulated street vendings.

In heavily affected communities, xiagang was also widely attributed as being the major cause for poverty, homelessness, crime, mass incidents and other forms of social unrest. These developments placed additional pressure on local governments, including rising expenditure on stability maintenance by public security and urban management.

Xiagang therefore had lasting economic and social consequences for affected workers and industrial communities, and became an important subject of labor activism, scholarship, and cultural representations of Chinese society since its economic reforms. Upon establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) transitioned the country towards a planned economy where essentially all economic activities were placed under state control, and private sector was officially non-existent.

Under this economic system, SOEs were intended to be not merely an organization for production but work units tasked with providing lifetime employment to urban populations, while guaranteeing most of basic necessities its members needed from cradle to grave. This Maoist mode of egalitarianism, combined with the traditional Chinese belief in collectivism, was therefore colloquially coined as the "Iron Rice Bowl" (铁饭碗), in which staff and workers employed in such enterprises not only enjoyed better pay and social status, but also feelings of genuine pride in their working-class identity.

However, the state's commitment to providing complete social care was materialized largely at the cost of economic efficiency. By treating overstaffing as an obligation, China has managed to provide jobs to an enormous labor force about 29% of the world labor supply, and almost twice as large as the total work forces from all developing countries.

Also, with all production ordered by the government, the operation of these enterprises were detached from and irresponsive to the actual demands of the consumers. Whether in state-owned or, among the very few exceptions, private enterprises, workers were not allowed to be dismissed, and there were no corresponding mechanism for bankruptcy.

Some severely loss-making enterprises ended up becoming non-performing assets of the state. Enterprises lacking competition and operating without profit or loss had no incentive to develop new technologies or expand production.

The consequence was endemic stagnation, low wages, and scarcity, in which lack of motivation to improve or expand production meant that most commodities had to be placed under a rigid rationing system. From 1950 to 1973, China's GDP per capita grew at a rate of 2.9% per year on average, placing it far below the rate of growth achieved by neighboring countries and regions such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan ruled by the rivaling Republic of China (ROC) during the same period.

Cinematography

The era of Xiagang has been a recurring subject in contemporary Chinese literature and cinema. Critically acclaimed films such as The Piano in a Factory (钢的琴, 2010), So Long, My Son (地久天长, 2019), and the television dramas of A Lifelong Journey (人世间, 2022) and The Long Season (漫长的季节, 2023) explore in depth the hope and despair experienced by working-class families in the aftermath of large-scale layoffs from SOEs.

These cultural depictions reflect the profound psychological and social consequences of China's economic reforms in late-1990s.

Music

Omnipotent Youth Society (万能青年旅店), the Chinese indie rock band formed in Shijiazhuang, a city whose once-prominent pharmaceutical and heavy industrial base was severely affected by state-owned enterprise reforms, has been widely interpreted as reflecting the social atmosphere of post-industrial Northern China following mass layoffs of the Xiagang period. Their lyrics frequently depict economic stagnation, unemployment, and the erosion of traditional working-class identities, all of which were common consequences of SOE restructuring in cities across the Northeast and North China Plain.

Although the band does not reference Xiagang explicitly, critics have described their music as capturing the dislocation and disillusionment experienced by a generation during and after the layoffs.

Cuisine

After Xiagang, many unemployed workers in the Northeast entered the catering and retail industries because of their low threshold, low cost, fast capital recovery and flexible time schedule. They invented the now famous street foods (小吃: xiaochi) such as kaojijia (烤鸡架: grilled chicken frame) in Shenyang, Northeast-style shaokao inspired by Uyghur kawap from Xinjiang, and malatang (麻辣烫) recreated from the original Sichuan recipe.

See also

Danwei Iron Rice Bowl State-Owned Enterprises of China Reform and Opening Up Economic Inequality in China Corruption in China

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378762791 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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