Cursed equilibrium

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In game theory, a cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is a generalization of the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium, allowing for players to underestimate the connection between other players' equilibrium actions and their types – that is, the behavioral bias of neglecting the link between what others know and what others do. Intuitively, in a cursed equilibrium players "average away" the information regarding other players' types' mixed strategies. The solution concept was first introduced by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin in 2005, and has since become a canonical behavioral solution concept for Bayesian games in behavioral economics.

In game theory, a cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is a generalization of the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium, allowing for players to underestimate the connection between other players' equilibrium actions and their types – that is, the behavioral bias of neglecting the link between what others know and what others do. Intuitively, in a cursed equilibrium players "average away" the information regarding other players' types' mixed strategies. The solution concept was first introduced by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin in 2005, and has since become a canonical behavioral solution concept for Bayesian games in behavioral economics. Let I be a finite set of players and for each i \in I , define A_i their finite set of possible actions and T_i as their finite set of possible types; the sets A = \prod_{i \in I} A_i and T = \prod_{i \in I} T_i are the sets of joint action and type profiles, respectively. Each player has a utility function u_i : A \times T \rightarrow \mathbb R , and types are distributed according to a joint probability distribution p \in \Delta T . A finite Bayesian game consists of the data G = ((A_i, T_i, u_i)_{i \in I}, p) . For notational convenience, we also define the projections A_{-i}= \prod_{j \neq i} A_j and T_{-i} = \prod_{j \neq i} T_j , and let \sigma_{-i} : T_{-i} \rightarrow \prod_{j \neq i} \Delta A_j be the joint mixed strategy of players j \neq i , where \sigma_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_{-i}) gives the probability that players j \neq i play action profile a_{-i} when they are of type t_{-i} . Definition: a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for a finite Bayesian game G = ((A_i, T_i, u_i)_{i \in I}, p) consists of a strategy profile \sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} such that, for every i \in I , every t_i \in T_i , and every action a_i^* played with positive probability \sigma_i ( a_i^* | t_i) > 0 , we have a_i^* \in \underset{a_i \in A_i}\operatorname{argmax} \sum_{t_{-i} \in T_{-i}} p_i(t_{-i} | t_i) \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_{-i}) u_i (a_i, a_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i}) where p_i(t_{-i} | t_i) = \frac{p(t_i, t_{-i})}{\sum_{t_{-i} \in T_{-i}} p(t_{i} | t_{-i}) p(t_{-i}) } is player i 's beliefs about other players types t_{-i} given his own type t_i . \overline{\sigma}_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_i)= \sum_{t_{-i} \in T_i} p_i(t_{-i} | t_i) \sigma_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_{-i}) Notice that \overline{\sigma}_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_i) does not depend on t_{-i} . It gives the probability, viewed from the perspective of player i when he is of type t_i , that the other players will play action profile a_{-i} when they follow the mixed strategy \sigma_{-i} . More specifically, the information contained in \overline{\sigma}_{-i} does not allow player i to assess the direct relation between a_{-i} and t_{-i} given by \sigma_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_{-i}) . \chi -cursed equilibrium for a finite Bayesian game G = ((A_i, T_i, u_i)_{i \in I}, p) as a strategy profile \sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} such that, for every i \in I , every t_i \in T_i , we have a_i^* \in \underset{a_i \in A_i}\operatorname{argmax} \sum_{t_{-i} \in T_{-i}} p_i(t_{-i} | t_i) \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left[\chi \overline{\sigma}_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_i) + (1- \chi)\sigma_{-i} (a_{-i} | t_{-i}) \right] u_i (a_i, a_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i}) for every action a_i^* played with positive probability \sigma_i ( a_i^* | t_i) > 0 . For \chi = 0 , we have the usual BNE. For \chi = 1 , the equilibrium is referred to as a fully cursed equilibrium, and the players in it as fully cursed.

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1316393650 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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