Lesson plan
Cursed equilibrium
In game theory, a cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is a generalization of the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium, allowing for players to underestimate the connection between other players' equilibrium actions and their types – that is, the behavioral bias of neglecting the link between what others know and what others do. Intuitively, in a cursed equilibrium players "average away" the information regarding other players' types' mixed strategies. The solution concept was first introduced by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin in 2005, and has since become a canonical behavioral solution concept for Bayesian games in behavioral economics.
Article summary
In game theory, a cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is a generalization of the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium, allowing for players to underestimate the connection between other players' equilibrium actions and their types – that is, the behavioral bias of neglecting the link between what others know and what others do. Intuitively, in a cursed equilibrium players "average away" the information regarding other players' types' mixed strategies. The solution concept was first introduced by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin in 2005, and has since become a canonical behavioral solution concept for Bayesian games in behavioral economics.
Key claims
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Discussion questions
- Summarise the article in your own words. Which single claim would you verify first, and why?
- Which claim in this article is most likely to be revised as the sources update? How would you check its current status?
- If two sources disagreed about one of these facts, what would you need in order to trust one over the other?
Bibliography
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Key claims and bibliography are generated from the same tracked claims and sources as the article page.