Virtual valuation

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In auction theory, particularly Bayesian-optimal mechanism design, a virtual valuation of an agent is a function that measures the surplus that can be extracted from that agent. A typical application is a seller who wants to sell an item to a potential buyer and wants to decide on the optimal price. The optimal price depends on the valuation of the buyer to the item, v . The seller does not know v exactly, but he assumes that v is a random variable, with some cumulative distribution function F(v) and probability distribution function f(v) := F'(v) . The virtual valuation of the agent is defined as: :: r(v) := v - \frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)}

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In auction theory, particularly Bayesian-optimal mechanism design, a virtual valuation of an agent is a function that measures the surplus that can be extracted from that agent. A typical application is a seller who wants to sell an item to a potential buyer and wants to decide on the optimal price. The optimal price depends on the valuation of the buyer to the item, v . The seller does not know v exactly, but he assumes that v is a random variable, with some cumulative distribution function F(v) and probability distribution function f(v) := F'(v) .

The virtual valuation of the agent is defined as: r(v) := v - \frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)} r(p) = 0 This guarantees that the buyer will buy the item, if and only if his virtual-valuation is weakly-positive, so the seller will have a weakly-positive expected profit.

This exactly equals the optimal sale price – the price that maximizes the expected value of the seller's profit, given the distribution of valuations: p = \operatorname{argmax}_v v\cdot (1-F(v)) Virtual valuations can be used to construct Bayesian-optimal mechanisms also when there are multiple buyers, or different item-types. F(v) = v \text{ in } [0,1] f(v) = 1 \text{ in } [0,1] r(v) = 2v-1 \text{ in } [0,1] r^{-1}(0) = 1/2 , so the optimal single-item price is 1/2. 2.

The buyer's valuation has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. w(v) is monotonically increasing, and crosses the x-axis in about 0.75, so this is the optimal price. The crossing point moves right when the standard deviation is larger. r(v) := \frac{f(v)}{1-F(v)} Monotone-hazard-rate implies regularity, but the opposite is not true. The proof is simple: the monotone hazard rate implies -\frac{1}{r(v)} is weakly increasing in v and therefore the virtual valuation v-\frac{1}{r(v)} is strictly increasing in v .

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